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ARTICLES
BIOTECHNOLOGY AND THE COMMERCIAL
USE OF HUMAN CELLS: TOWARD AN
ORGANIC VIEW OF LIFE AND
TECHNOLOGY
Patricia A. Martint
Martin L. Lagodtt
I. INTRODUCTION
Biotechnology is the technology of life. It is young and chal-
lenging, raising new legal issues and provoking new concern regard-
ing the role of technology in human life. The tools of biotechnology
have made it possible to isolate and maintain cell cultures in a labo-
ratory, to fuse different kinds of cells, and to alter and then clone
cells' genetic material.' New commercial products can be made
with these methods.2 However, difficult issues arise when human
cells or genes are involved. From the perspective of the medical
patient or research subject, these issues concern the individual
rights affected by the commercial exploitation of an individual's
unique genetic identity.
Such issues are raised by Moore v. The Regents of the University
of California.3 In this case, Mr. John Moore claims that tissue4 re-
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1. See infra notes 18-41 and accompanying text.
2. See infra note 44 and accompanying text.
3. Moore v. The Regents of the University of California, 202 Cal. App. 3d 1230, 249
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moved from his body was used to establish a novel cell line.5 His
cells are unusual. When cultured, they produce a wide variety of
proteins that have enormous value as human therapeutics; and,
with genetic engineering techniques, these proteins can be produced
on a large scale.6 The cell line was established by Dr. David W.
Golde, Mr. Moore's physician, along with another investigator.7 In
1984, a patent was issued covering the cell line as well as its deriva-
tive products, and commercial exploitation has begun.8 Dr. Golde
has entered into development contracts with two companies, Genet-
ics Institute, Inc. ("Genetics") and Sandoz Pharmaceutical Corpo-
ration ("Sandoz"), under which Dr. Golde acquired 75,000 shares
of Genetics' stock; Genetics paid $330,000 to Dr. Golde and the
Regents of the University of California (the "University"); and San-
doz paid $110,000 to Dr. Golde and the University.9 During this
period, Mr. Moore was treated for hairy-cell leukemia but his cell
line was established and developed without his knowledge or con-
sent.10 By 1990, the commercial value of his cell line is expected to
exceed $3 billion.1'
The basic issues raised in Moore concern the rights one may
have in the commercial exploitation of his or her own body tissue. 12
These rights are analyzed in the first part of this article, and the
Cal. Rptr. 494, rev. granted, 252 Cal. Rptr. 816 (1988) (hereinafter Moore). As of this writ-
ing, Moore is pending before the California Supreme Court where the legal sufficiency of the
complaint remains in issue. (See infra notes 68-71 and accompanying text for a discussion of
the procedural history of the case). Hence, the allegations of the complaint have yet to be
proven, see 249 Cal. Rptr. at 498, n.1, and generally will be assumed to be true for the pur-
pose of this analysis.
4. Unless otherwise indicated, "tissue" is used broadly to refer to any biological part
or product of the human body.
5. Moore, 249 Cal. Rptr. at 498, 499-500. A "cell line" has been defined as a sample of
cells, adapted to artificial laboratory cultivation, that sustain continuous, indefinite growth in
culture. U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, New Developments in Biotechnol-
ogy: Ownership of Human Tissues and Cells - Special Report 3 n.1, 33 OTA-BA-337 (Wash-
ington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, March 1987) (hereinafter Ownership of
Human Tissues).
6. Moore, 249 Cal. Rptr. at 498.
7. Id. at 498, 499-500.
8. Id. at 498, 501. See also id. at 516-30 (patent covering cell-line and derivative prod-
ucts attached as Appendix A to court's opinion).
9. Id. at 498, 500-501.
10. Id. at 498, 499-500, 501.
11. Id. at 501.
12. This article does not address the use of embryonic or fetal tissue in research and
product development. The use of such tissue involves special concerns such as the moral and
legal status of the human embryo and fetus, the relationship between research and abortion,
and the question of who (if anyone) has the right to consent to research with an abortus.
These issues are beyond the scope of this article.
TOWARD AN ORGANIC VIEW
following arguments are made: The principle of informed consent
protects an individual's right to be informed if the removal of his or
her tissue will serve a commercial purpose. 13 The right to privacy
established by tort law protects an individual's right to consent to
the commercial use of his or her tissue.' 4 Further, this new aspect
of the privacy right may be recognized as a protectable property
right, giving one the right to redress if the right is infringed.'"
In Moore, this analysis supports Mr. Moore's right to sue for a
reasonable share of the profits derived from the commercial ex-
ploitation of his cell line. Generally applied to medical treatment
and biomedical research, the analysis would require fuller disclo-
sure during the informed consent process so the individual involved
could decide whether or not to participate in research linked to
some kind of commercial development. Further, the analysis would
entitle individuals to compensation, for the commercial use of their
tissue, depending on the relative weight of various factors: for exam-
ple, whether the individual's tissue was unique, whether the tissue
of one individual or many individuals was used in a research pro-
ject, and whether the research project was related directly to a com-
mercial development.
Moore is thus important as legal precedent. On a policy level,
Moore is important because it invites us to reexamine the relation-
ship between our humanity and technology, to ask what it means to
use technology in a human way as well as what it means to use our
humanity in a technical way. This question is addressed in the sec-
ond part of this article by exploring the assumptions of our modem
world view.' 6 As the discussion postulates, we are the heirs of a
mechanistic world view, supported by the Scientific Revolution of
the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Yet, in our time, this view
is giving way to a more integrated world view, supported by the
dynamic implications of more recent scientific work. This transi-
tion, should enhance our understanding of nature, human dignity,
the connections among individuals, and the human aspects of our
technical abilities.'" Also, the transition is germane to Moore, for
13. See infra notes 73-130 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 131-160 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 161-187 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 245-296 and accompanying text. The second part is more in the
nature of a speculative essay. Drawing mainly from the history of science and literature, it
thus tries to orient the policy issues Moore has raised within a larger context than the law
alone can provide.
17. See Tribe, Technology Assessment and the Fourth Discontinuity: The Limits of In-
strumental Rationality, 46 S. CAL. L. REv. 617 (1973) [hereinafter Technology Assessment].
Discussing the relationship between man, technology, and contemporary ways of thought,
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Moore points to the problems of mechanism as well as to the solu-
tions made possible by a more organic view of the relationship be-
tween life and technology.
II. Moore: Human Dignity and the Commercial Use of Human
Tissue
A. Understanding The Dispute In Moore
1. The Scientific and Commercial Context
Moore is the product of biotechnology, and biotechnology pres-
ently includes three main techniques: cell and tissue culture tech-
nology, hybridoma technology, and recombinant DNA tech-
nology.18 A cell culture is based on a sample of cells removed from
an organism; a tissue culture is based on an isolated piece of tis-
sue.19 In either event, the aim of a laboratory culture is to establish
a cell line, that is, a sample of cells able to grow in culture over a
continuous, indefinite period of time.?' The chance of success, how-
ever, is low.21 For example, tissue may be contaminated or dam-
aged when it is removed, and human cultures require a complex
mix of nutrients, strict temperature controls, and constant levels of
acidity. 2 Further, it is not yet known exactly how or why one cul-
ture becomes "immortal" and another does not.23
Hybridoma technology is based on cell fusion, a technique in
which cells from different sources are fused to form a hybrid.24 To
Professor Tribe points to a "discontinuity" between man and machines which, he argues, is
related to "instrumental rationality," that is, a mode of thought and action based on the
selection of efficacious, rational means to achieve particular ends or values. See id. at 617-18.
To bridge this man-machine (or subject-object) discontinuity and transcend the limits of in-
strumental rationality, Tribe relies on three postulates: (1) that "an act shapes the actor no
less than the actor chooses the act," id. at 654-54; (2) that reason and desire (or means and
ends) really form an integrated reality rather than an inexorable dichotomy, Id. at 654; and
(3) that rationality has both an individual and a communal dimension-individual in the
sense that individual actions express a personal commitment and are deeply rooted in the
individual's life history, and communal in the sense that individuals must act with reference
to coherent bodies of principle which are shared by communities and which may evolve over
time. Id. at 652-54; See also Tribe, Ways Not To Think About Plastic Trees New Foundations
for Environmental Law, 83 YALE L. 1 1315, 1326-27, 1327 n.58 (1974) [hereinafter Plastic
Trees]. Tribe thus envisions a "constitutive rationality" or an "organic shaping of an insepa-
rable triad consisting of men, tools, and values as the three define and constitute one another
over time." Technology Assessment, supra note 17, at 654.
18. Ownership of Human Tissues, supra note 5, at 31.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 33.
21. Id. at 32, 33.
22. See id. at 33.
23. See id. at 33-34.
24. Id. at 35.
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create a "hybridoma," a tumor cell (called a myeloma) is fused with
a certain kind of white blood cell (called a B lymphocyte or B
cell).25 The tumor cell is immortal-it grows and multiplies indefi-
nitely in culture.26 A B cell responds to a specific foreign substance
(called an antigen) by producing a specific antibody to the sub-
stance.27 Hence, if a B cell is injected with a particular antigen and
then fused with a myeloma, the resulting hybridoma will be an im-
mortal cell line producing a single, specific (or monoclonal)
antibody.28
Hybridoma research is also progressing with the study of T
lymphocytes (or T cells) and macrophages. Like B cells, these are
specialized cells involved in the immune system; but, instead of pro-
ducing antibodies, they produce proteins which regulate the
immune response by transmitting signals between cells.29 These
protein molecules are referred to as "lymphokines,"30 and efforts
are now being made to produce lymphokines by fusing an immortal
cancer cell with an isolated T cell, thus creating a T cell
hybridoma31
Recombinant DNA technology reflects the brief but dramatic
history of genetics. In the mid-nineteenth century, Gregor Mendel
identified the basic mechanism of heredity in what are now called
genes.32 In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, micro-
scopic studies revealed new details about the cell, including the cell
nucleus with its "colored bodies" or chromosomes (made more visi-
ble by dye) which carried the Mendelian gene.33 In the early 1940s,
investigators identified the material of which genes are made, deox-
yribonucleic acid ("DNA"). 34 In 1953, James Watson and Francis
Crick uncovered the structure of DNA, the elegant double helix.35
In the early 1970's, restriction enzymes were discovered (spe-
cial types of complex proteins that catalyze specific biochemical re-
25. Id. at 37-38.
26. Id. at 38.
27. Id. at 37-38.
28. Id. at 38.
29. Id. at 38-39.
30. Id. at 39.
31. Id.
32. Unites States Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, Impacts of Applied Genet-
ics, reprinted in J. AREEN, P. KING, S. GOLDBERG, & A. CAPRON, LAW, SCIENCE AND
MEDICINE 3 (1984) (hereinafter Areen, et. al).
33. Id. at 4.
34. Id.
35. Id.
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actions), which made it possible to "cut" DNA at certain points. 36
Once cut, the exposed ends are "sticky" and attach to other DNA
fragments cut by the same process. 37 The resulting strand of DNA
is known as "recombinant DNA" or "rDNA. ' '38 In a slight varia-
tion on this technique, a piece of DNA can be spliced into the plas-
mid of a bacterium, 39 (a plasmid is a ring of DNA outside the
bacterium's single chromosome), and then the hybrid plasmid can
be transferred back into the bacterium. The new gene functions in-
side the bacterium and is replicated many times; i.e., the hybrid
plasmid replicates autonomously inside the bacterium and the bac-
terium itself replicates in culture.40 Thus, by way of example, if the
human gene responsible for insulin production is spliced into a plas-
mid, the resulting culture of bacteria will contain many copies of
the new gene and produce large amounts of human insulin.41
In 1980 and 1984, two related patents were issued to Stanford
University, one covering the basic process of creating rDNA and
the other covering genetically engineered plasmids.42 Also in 1980,
the United States Supreme Court held that genetically engineered
bacteria (the actual microorganisms) were subject to patent
protection.43
Hence, in the nineteen eighties, biotechnology has emerged as a
nascent but explosive industry with great commercial potential in
areas as diverse as human therapeutics, plant agriculture, and haz-
ardous waste management.' As the technology has grown, new
36. President's Comm'n for the Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine and Biomedical
and Behavioral Research, Splicing Life 32 (1982) (hereinafter Splicing Life). See also Owner-
ship of Human Tissues, supra note 5, at 41-44, for a brief review of recombinant DNA
technology.
37. Ownership of Human Tissues, supra note 5, at 41-44.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 32-33.
40. Id. at 33.
41. Id.
42. AREEN, supra note 32, at 5.
43. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980).
44. See generally U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, New Developments
in Biotechnology: U.S. Investment in Biotechnology - Special Report 79-80, OTA-BA-360,
(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, July 1988) (hereinafter Investment in
Biotechnology) (areas of research and development in biotechnology include therapeutics and
diagnostics for use in human health care, chemicals, plant and animal agriculture, biotechnol-
ogy reagents, biotechnology equipment, and cell cultures, with human health care attracting
the greatest investment). With respect to human therapeutics, biotechnology has been ap-
plied to create new pharmaceuticals or products with therapeutic value, id. at 161; in the area
of plant agriculture, to modify plants in agriculture or cultivation so "they can resist insects
and disease, grow in harsh environments, provide their own nitrogen fertilizer, or be more
nutritious," id. at 194; and in hazardous waste management, "to engineer systems that use
biological processes to degrade, detoxify, or accumulate contaminants." Id. at 2323. For a
[Vol. 5
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links between academics and industry have been forged,4" and gen-
erous research and development support has been obtained from
many sectors: the federal government, 46 state government,47 and
commercial industry (including new biotechnology companies and
older, more diversified corporations).4
2. The Facts and Procedural Posture of the Moore
Lawsuit
The techniques and sociology of biotechnology are evident in
Moore. In 1976, John Moore was referred to the Medical Center of
the University of California, Los Angeles ("UCLA") for treatment
of hairy-cell leukemia.49 In October 1976, Mr. Moore's spleen was
good overview of the biotechniques used in these areas as well as the factors affecting research
and development, see id. at 159-90 (therapeutics), 191-220 (plant agriculture), 221-51 (haz-
ardous waste management).
45. Collaboration between universities and industry has become common in biotechnol-
ogy research. See generally Investment in Biotechnology, supra note 44, at 111-27. Such col-
laborative arrangements may take a variety of forms. For example, private industry may
fund university research; universities may acquire an equity (or financial) interest in biotech-
nology firms; or universities and industry may join in commercial joint ventures or research
consortia. See id. at 113, 115-17. Likewise, university faculty may acquire an equity interest
in biotechnology companies or may become involved with industry through research con-
tracts or grants, consulting agreements, or positions as a company officer, director, or mem-
ber of a science advisory board. See id. at 116. Such arrangements may enhance the
productivity of both academics and industry, but also may pose new problems, such as re-
stricting publication and the free exchange of information, shifting research toward more
commercial applications, and causing conflicts in allegiance between the university and indus-
try. See id at 118-25.
46. Total federal funding of biotechnology research and development was in the range
of $2.72 billion in fiscal year 1987, $2.28 billion in fiscal year 1986, and $2.16 billion in fiscal
year 1985, with the National Institutes of Health contributing 83.5% of these amounts. In-
vestment in Biotechnology, supra note 44, at 37. See generally id. at 33-52.
47. As of 1986, 33 states had programs in place designed to foster biotechnology
through activities such as the following: research and development spending in state univer-
sities and biotechnology companies (33 states), biotechnology training at state colleges and
universities (23 states), financial and technical support for biotechnology companies (27
states), and the creation of "centers" to encourage collaboration between academic disci-
plines, between universities, and between universities and industry (28 states). Investment in
Biotechnology, supra note 44, at 58-62. Leadership has come from the executive branch of
state government, the state legislature, or state university system. See generally id. at 53-73.
48. As of January 1988, some 403 companies, started as entrepreneurial ventures to
commercialize biotechnology, were actively engaged in biotechnology work; and some 70
large, more established corporations with diversified product lines had significant investments
in biotechnology. See Investments in Biotechnology, supra note 44, at 77-80. In 1987, these
two groups of companies invested a total estimated amount of $1.5 billion to $2.0 billion in
biotechnology research and development (roughly two-thirds of the amount invested by the
federal government). See generally id. at 76-94.
49. Moore, 249 Cal. Rptr. at 498, 520-21 ("Case History" section of patent attached as
Appendix A to court's opinion).
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removed at UCLA.5" From November 1976 through September
1983, Mr. Moore (a Washington resident) made a number of fol-
low-up visits to UCLA for further removal of blood, blood serum,
skin, bone marrow aspirate, and sperm.51
Mr. Moore's cells are unique. They can be cultured for an in-
definite period of time (creating a cell line) and maintain the proper-
ties of T lymphoblasts (cells giving rise to T lymphocytes). 52 Also,
the cells produce a wide variety of proteins, which normal T cells
produce when stimulated by an antigen (or foreign substance),53
which can be isolated. Some of these proteins include immune in-
terferon (a lymphokine), erythroid potentiating activity (also a
lymphokine) which is important in the early formation of red blood
cells, and colony stimulating factor which stimulates the formation
of granulocytes (a certain kind of white blood cell) and macro-
phages (both important in regulating the immune response).54
Through such protein production, the cells provide a source of the
genes from which the proteins are expressed;55 and with genetic en-
gineering techniques, these genes can be introduced into microorga-
nisms which then become busy micro-factories, designed for
continuous, large-scale protein production.56 The resulting proteins
have enormous potential for therapeutic use in human beings.57
Mr. Moore's physician at UCLA, Dr. David W. Golde, and
Shirley G. Quan, another employee of UCLA, established the cell
line using Mr. Moore's spleen cells.58 On January 30, 1981, Dr.
Golde and Ms. Quan filed a patent application based on the cell line
they named "Mo."59 On January 6, 1983, the first patent applica-
tion was abandoned and a second was filed; and on March 20, 1984,
50. Id.
51. Id. at 499, 500.
52. Id. at 518, 519, 521 ("Summary of the Invention," "Description of the Specific
Embodiments," and "Experimental Procedures" sections of the patent attached as Appendix
A to the court's opinion).
53. Id. at 519 ("Description of the Specific Embodiments" section of the patent at-
tached as Appendix A to the court's opinion).
54. Id. at 518, 519-20 ("Summary of the Invention" and "Description of the Specific
Embodiments" sections of the patent attached as Appendix A to the court's opinion), For a
general overview of research involving lymphokines, see Ownership of Human Tissues, supra
note 5, at 38-40.
55. Moore, 249 Cal. Rptr. at 518 ("Summary of the Invention" section of the patent
attached as Exhibit A to the court's opinion).
56. Id.
57. Id. at 498.
58. Id. at 498, 517 (patent, attached as Appendix A to court's opinion, listing Dr.
Golde and Ms. Quan as "inventors").
59. See id. at 517 (patent attached as Appendix A to court's opinion).
[Vol. 5
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a patent was issued covering the Mo line and its derivative prod-
ucts.' ° The patent rights were assigned to the University.61
During this same period in 1981, 1982, and 1983, Dr. Golde
contracted with two companies, Genetics and Sandoz, to develop
the Mo line's commercial potential. 2 As part of these transactions,
Dr. Golde acquired 75,000 shares of Genetics' stock at a nominal
price; Genetics paid $330,000 over three years to Dr. Golde and the
University; and Sandoz paid $110,000 to Dr. Golde and the
University.63
On April 11, 1983, Mr. Moore made another trip to UCLA
and was asked to sign a consent form allowing tissue samples to be
taken from him and used in research. Mr. Moore signed the form. 6
On September 20, 1983, Mr. Moore again was asked to sign a con-
sent form allowing tissue to be removed and used in research, but
this form contained an express provision which Mr. Moore could
check to grant to the University any rights he might have in his cell
line or any product developed from his blood or bone marrow. Mr.
Moore signed the form, but declined to check the provision.65
Neither Dr. Golde, Ms. Quan, nor any other person acting on
behalf of the University, Genetics, or Sandoz ever informed Mr.
Moore of any facts regarding his cell line's commercial value.66 By
1990, the market for products derived from his cell line or tissues is
estimated to be more than $3 billion.67
Based on these allegations, Mr. Moore sued the University, Dr.
Golde, Ms. Quan, Genetics, and Sandoz on a variety of theories,
including conversion, lack of informed consent, breach of fiduciary
duty, fraud and deceit, unjust enrichment, quasi-contract, breach of
the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, intentional in-
fliction of emotional distress, negligent misrepresentation, interfer-
ence with prospective advantage, slander of title, accounting, and
declaratory relief.68 The trial court sustained demurrers to the
complaint and dismissed the action. The court reasoned that Mr.
Moore had not stated a cause of action for conversion and that the
60. Id. at 498, 500, 501, 516-30 (patent attached as Appendix A to court's opinion).
61. Id. at 501, 517 (patent, attached as Appendix A to court's opinion, listing the Uni-
versity as assignee).
62. Id. at 498, 500-501.
63. Id. at 500-501.
64. Id. at 501.
65. Id. at 501, 531-32 (consent form attached as Appendix B to court's opinion).
66. Id. at 498-99, 499-500, 501.
67. Id. at 498-99, 501.
68. Id. at 499.
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other counts, which incorporated the allegations of the conversion
count, were defective for the same reason.
69
The Court of Appeal reversed the judgments of dismissal,
holding that Mr. Moore could state a cause of action for conver-
sion.70 In a thought-provoking opinion, the appellate court con-
cluded that Mr. Moore had a property interest in his own body, had
not abandoned the interest in his spleen by consenting to its surgical
removal (a "splenectomy"), and had not consented to the commer-
cial exploitation of his tissue by consenting to the surgery or to sub-
sequent medical research.7 Hence, the basic issues raised in Moore
concern any protectable rights one might have in the commercial
exploitation of his or her own body tissue.72
B. Informed Consent And the Removal of Human Tissue
For A Commercial Purpose
1. Informed Consent and the Medical Patient
a. Tort Law
John Moore was both a medical patient and a research subject.
When he was referred to UCLA for treatment of hairy-cell leuke-
mia, he consented to a splenectomy for that purpose. Seven years
later, he also consented to the removal of other tissue "for the pur-
pose of scientific investigation of the body's defense against dis-
69. Id. at 502, 512.
70. Id. at 503, 512, 515. The appellate court also remanded the case to the trial court
for ruling on the defendants' demurrers to the other causes of action. Id. at 503, 514, 515.
71. Id. at 504-11.
72. Situations similar to Moore have arisen previously but have been settled out of
court. See Royston, Cell Lines from Human Patients: Who Owns Them? A Case Report, 33
CLINICAL REs. 442 (Oct. 1985) (a dispute between the University of California and the
Hagiwara family, regarding the ownership rights in a cell line (a B cell hybridoma) which had
been derived from cancer cells removed from Mrs. Hagiwara, was settled by an agreement
(1) to assign the patent rights in the cell line to the University of California, and (2) to license
back to the Hagiwara Institute of Health, the right to use the cell line in Japan and other
Asian countries; the Hagiwara Institute of Health was located in Japan and run by Mrs.
Hagiwara's scientist-husband); Rowland, Letter Licenses for Biotechnology, 1 HIGH TECH. L.
J. 99, 100-102 (1986) (Dr. Golde of UCLA Medical School (ater sued by Mr. Moore) ob-
tained a cell line from a cancer patient and gave it to Dr. Robert Gallo of the National
Cancer Institute who discovered it was an interferon over-producer and gave it to Dr. Sidney
Pestka of the Hoffinan-LaRoche Institute of Molecular Biology ("Hoffman-LaRoche") which
entered into a development effort with Genentech, Inc. to produce interferon in microorga-
nisms; Hoffman-LaRoche sued the University of California ("UC") to establish that UC did
not have any rights in the cell line; UC counter-sued for conversion (one of the theories Mr.
Moore later alleged) and misappropriation of trade secrets; the case settled but remains an
ironic forerunner to Mr. Moore's lawsuit).
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ease." 73 Mr. Moore's consent to those procedures implicates the
legal doctrine of informed consent, and the allegations in Moore
raise serious informed consent issues.
Within the context of medical treatment, the informed consent
doctrine can be traced through the development of both tort law
and constitutional law.74 As acommon law doctrine, the notion of
"informed consent" first appeared in Salgo v. Leland Stanford, Jr.
University Board of Trustees.75 In this 1957 decision, the California
Court of Appeal held that a physician could incur malpractice lia-
bility by "withhold[ing] any facts which are necessary to ... the
basis of an intelligent consent by the patient to the proposed treat-
ment.",76 In other words, a physician's duty to his or her patient
required "the full disclosure of facts necessary to an informed
consent."
77
In Cobbs v. Grant78 and Truman v. Thomas,79 the California
Supreme Court expressly based the physician's duty to disclose on
four "postulates":
The first is that patients are generally persons unlearned in the
medical sciences and therefore, except in rare cases . .. the
knowledge of patient and physician are not in parity. The second
is that a person of adult years and in sound mind has the right, in
the exercise of control over his own body, to determine whether
or not to submit to lawful medical treatment. The third is that
the patient's consent to treatment, to be effective, must be an in-
formed consent. And the fourth is that the patient, being un-
learned in the medical sciences, has an abject dependence upon,
and trust in his physician for the information upon which he re-
lies during the decisional process, thus raising an obligation in
73. Moore, 249 Cal. Rptr. 498, 531 (consent form attached as Appendix B to court's
opinion).
74. Conservatorship of Drabick, 200 Cal. App. 3d 185,'245 Cal. Rptr. 840, 853 n.20,
(1988), cert. denied, Drabick v. Drabick, 109 S. Ct. 399 (1988), reh'g denied, 109 S. Ct. 828
(1989) (right to determine scope of medical treatment is grounded in constitutional right of
privacy and common law); Keyhea v. Rushen, 178 Cal. App. 3d 526, 640, 223 Cal. Rptr. 746,
754 (1986) (right to give or withhold informed consent to medical treatment settled under
state constitutional right of privacy and the common law); Foy v. Greenblott, 141 Cal. App.
3d 1, 11, 190 Cal. Rptr. 84, 91 (1983) (informed consent is a right arising from state constitu-
tional right of privacy and the common law).
75. Salgo v. Leland Stanford, Jr. Univ. Bd. of Trustees, 157 Cal. App. 2d 560, 578
(1957). See Katz, Informed Consent-A Fairy Tale? Law's Vision, 39 U. Prrr. L. REv. 137,
138, 149-50 (1977) [hereinafter Katz].
76. Id. at 578.
77. Id. (emphasis added).
78. Cobbs v. Grant, 8 Cal. 3d 229, 104 Cal. Rptr. 505, 502 P.2d 1 (1972).
79. Truman v. Thomas, 27 Cal. 3d 285, 165 Cal. Rptr. 308, 611 P.2d 902 (1980).
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the physician that transcends arms-length transactions.90
Hence, whether a therapeutic procedure or diagnostic test is
involved, the physician must "divulge[ ]... all information relevant
to a meaningful decisional process.""1 In other words, the physi-
cian must inform the patient of any information which might be
"material" to the patient's decision. 82
[Miaterial information is that which the physician knows or
should know would be regarded as significant by a reasonable
person in the patient's position when deciding to accept or reject
the recommended medical procedure. To be material, a fact
must also be one which is not commonly appreciated. If the phy-
sician knows or should know the patient's unique concerns or
lack of familiarity with medical procedures, this may expand the
scope of required disclosure.83
Within the traditional area of medical malpractice, the physi-
cian's duty of disclosure is part of the physician's duty to treat the
patient with due care; and an action based on the physician's failure
to disclose material information sounds in negligence. 84 As a prac-
tical matter, however, it may be difficult to recover on this kind of
negligence theory because the patient must prove a causal connec-
tion between his or her injury and the physician's failure to in-
form.85 In other words, the patient must show that if he or she had
been informed of all pertinent information, he or she would have
declined to consent to the procedure in question. 6 Further, to
avoid the self-serving effect of perfect hindsight, the patient is held
80. Cobbs, 8 Cal. 3d at 242, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 513, quoted in, Truman, 27 Cal. 3d at 291,
165 Cal. Rptr. at 311. Other courts have relied on the same postulates when considering the
informed consent doctrine and imposing a reasonable duty to disclose on physicians. See,
eg., Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 780 (D.D.C.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1064 (1972).
81. Cobbs, 8 Cal. 3d at 242, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 505.
82. Id. at 245, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 515. See also, Truman, 27 Cal. 3d at 291, 165 Cal.
Rptr. at 311. In Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d at 786-88, the District of Columbia Circuit
likewise defined the physician's duty to disclose in terms of the patient's need to know mate-
rial information. As of 1987, some 19 jurisdictions (including California and the District of
Columbia) had adopted this kind of patient-oriented standard; some 26 jurisdictions had
adopted a professional standard of disclosure based on medical custom. See AREEN, supra
note 32, at 384, note 4 (1984 and Supp. 1987 at 71).
83. Truman, 27 Cal. 3d at 291, 165 Cal. Rptr. alt'311-12.
84. See Cobbs, 8 Cal. 3d at 239-41, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 511-12. In contrast, a battery
occurs if the physician performs a treatment without the patient's consent or performs a
treatment which is substantially different from a treatment to which the patient consented.
Id. at 239, 240, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 511, 512.
85. Id. at 245, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 515. Causation is one of the elements of a negligence
cause of action. 4 B. WrrJN, CALIFORNIA PROCEDURE PLEADING § 527 (3d ed. 1985)
(elements of negligence include duty, breach of duty, causation, and damages).
86. Cobbs, 8 Cal. 3d at 245, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 515.
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to an objective test; the controlling issue is "what would a prudent
person in the patient's position have decided if adequately informed
of all significant perils."87
Despite these practical problems of proof, the theory of in-
formed consent has given the patient a new stature within the doc-
tor-patient relationship. Now recognized as an individual with
distinct goals and values, the patient can enter into a new kind of
partnership with his or her physician, sharing responsibility for
medical decisions.88 Thus, even though the informed consent pro-
cess may be difficult to regulate in practice, 9 the principle of in-
formed consent remains an important expression of our collective
belief in individual autonomy as well as the necessary partnership
between doctor and patient.90
b. Constitutional Law
As a principle of tort law, the informed consent doctrine has
imposed new disclosure requirements on the physician and given
the patient new footing within the ordinary doctor-patient relation-
ship. As a principle of constitutional law, the informed consent
doctrine ensures that patient rights are held paramount.
In Cobbs, the California Supreme Court relied on the "postu-
late" that "a person of adult years and in sound mind has the right,
in the exercise of control over his own body, to determine whether
or not to submit to lawful medical treatment."91  Subsequently,
87. Id. at 245, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 515-16.
88. In an early, incisive analysis of the informed consent doctrine, Professor Jay Katz
illuminated the tension between courts' vision of individual autonomy and courts' deference
to professional paternalism. See Katz, supra note 75. In a more recent book, however, Pro-
fessor Katz has relied on the idea of informed consent to develop a more reciprocal model of
the physician-patient relationship based on a theory of mutual decision-making. See J.
KATZ, THE SILENT WORLD OF DocTOR AND PATIENT (1986). See also President's Comm'n
for the Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine and Biomedical and Behavioral Research,
Making Health Care Decisions A Report on the Ethical and Legal Implications of Informed
Consent in the Patient-Practitioner Relationship 36-39 (1982) [hereinafter Making Health
Care Decisions] (similar model based on "mutual participation-and shared decisionmaking").
89. As a legal doctrine, the theory of informed consent measures the objective content
of physician disclosures, not the quality of communication between physician and patient
and, hence, not the actual quality of the patient's consent. See Katz, supra note 75, at 146-47,
172-73. Moreover, in actual medical settings, the informed consent process varies widely
depending on the nature of the patient's condition and the proposed treatment as well as the
individuals and institution involved. See generally, Making Health Care Decisions, supra note
88 at 72-76, 78 n.16, 80-93.
90. See Making Health Care Decisions, supra note 88, at 16-17, 44-51.
91. Cobbs, 8 Cal. 3d at 242, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 513. This premise can be traced to
Schloendorff v. Soc'y of N.Y. Hosp., 211 N.Y. 125, 105 N.E. 92, 93 (1914) (Cardozo, J.)
("[Elvery human being of adult years and sound mind has a right to determine what shall be
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California courts have established that the constitutional right of
privacy protects the individual's right to refuse medical treatment,
including life support procedures.92
In Bartling v. Superior Court,9" the appellate court recognized
a patient's right to disconnect a machine called a "ventilator" which
mechanically sustained the patient's ability to breathe. In Bouvia v.
Superior Court,94 the appellate court sustained a patient's right to
remove a nasogastric tube which supplied the patient with nutrients
through a tube inserted through her nose and into her stomach. In
each case, the patient's medical condition was serious but not yet
diagnosed as terminal.9" Nevertheless, the patient's right to make
medical decisions was held paramount to any countervening inter-
done with his own body") (disapproved on other grounds in Bing v. Thunig, 2 N.Y.2d 656,
163 N.Y.S.2d 3, 143 N.E.2d 3 (1957)); Conservatorship of Drabick, 200 Cal. App. 3d at 206 n.
2, 245 Cal. Rptr. at 853 n.2.
92. Bouvia v. Superior Court, 179 Cal. App. 3d 1127, 1137,225 Cal. Rptr. 297, 300-301
(1986); Bartling v. Superior Court, 163 Cal. App. 3d 186, 193-95, 209 Cal. Rptr. 220, 224-25
(1984). See also Conservatorship of Morrison, 206 Cal. App. 3d 304, 253 Cal. Rptr. 530
(1988); Drabick, 200 Cal. App. 3d at 206, 245 Cal. Rptr. at 853.
This right also has been recognized by statute. See Cal. Health and Safety Code § 7186
(Deering Supp. 1989) ("The Legislature finds that adult persons have the fundamental right
to control the decisions relating to the rendering of their own medical care, including the
decision to have life-sustaining procedures withheld or withdrawn in instances of a terminal
condition"). The right thus underpins California's Natural Death Act, id. at §§ 7185-7195,
which allows patients with a terminal condition to execute a written document directing their
physicians to withhold or withdraw life-sustaining procedures. Similarly, the Keene Health
Care Agent Act, CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 2500-2508 (Deering 1986), provides for a statutory
form durable power of attorney for health care whereby one person can give another (an
"agent" or "attorney-in-fact") the power to make health care decisions on his or her behalf,
including decisions to refuse or withdraw life-prolonging care. Professional guidelines are in
accord. See Bouvia, 179 Cal. App. 3d at 1140-41, 225 Cal. Rptr. at 303.
93. Bartling v. Superior Court, 163 Cal. App. 3d 186, 209 Cal. Rptr. 220 (1984). Sev-
enty year old William Battling had emphysema, chronic respiratory failure, arteriosclerosis,
an abdominal aneurysm, a malignant lung tumor, alcoholism, and chronic acute anxiety/
depression. When the tumor was biopsied, his lung collapsed and could not be reinflated. A
tracheotomy was performed and he was placed on a ventilator. Mr. Bartling and his wife
sought an injunction to have the ventilator disconnected. Ironically, Mr. Bartling died (still
on the ventilator) before the Court of Appeal heard the case. The case thus becomes moot,
but the appellate court chose to render an opinion since the issues were capable of repetition.
94. Bouvia v. Superior Court, 179 Cal. App. 3d 1127,225 Cal. Rptr. 297 (1986). At the
time of the court's decision, Elizabeth Bouvia was 28 years old. Bedridden and unable to care
for herself, she suffered from cerebral palsy, quadriplegia and arthritis. For some time, she
had expressed the desire to die. Hence, when the medical staff where she was hospitalized
determined that she was not able to consume sufficient nutrients, they inserted a nasogastric
tube into Ms. Bouvia's body, against her will and without her consent. Ms. Bouvia then filed
an action for injunctive relief, seeking a court order to require the hospital and doctors to
remove the tube and to prohibit them from replacing the tube without her consent. She
prevailed in the Court of Appeal.
95. See Bartling, 163 Cal. App. 3d at 189, 192-93, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 220, 223; Bouvia,
179 Cal. App. 3d at 1139, 1142-44, 225 Cal. Rptr. at 302, 304-305.
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est, including the state's interest in preserving life.9 6 -As the Bouvia
court explained:
Here Elizabeth Bouvia's decision to forego medical treatment...
is not a medical decision for her physicians to make. Neither is it
a legal question whose soundness is to be resolved by lawyers or
judges. It is not a conditional right subject to approval by ethics
committees or courts of law. It is a moral and philosophical de-
cision that, being a competent adult, is her's alone.97
In Bouvia and Bartling, the patients were competent and able
to exercise their own rights of privacy. 98 Patient rights, however,
do not turn on competency. Recognizing the privacy rights of the
96. See Bartling, 163 Cal. App. 3d at 195-96, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 225-26; Bouvia, 179 Cal.
App. 3d at 1142-45, 225 Cal. Rptr. at 304-306. Four state interests have been argued in
opposition to the termination of life support: (1) preserving life, (2) preventing suicide, (3)
maintaining the ethical integrity of the medical profession, and (4) protecting innocent third
parties. Bartling, 163 Cal. App. 3d at 195, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 336; Bouvia, 179 Cal. App. 3d at
1142, 225 Cal. Rptr. at 304. See also Superintendent Of Belchertown v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass.
728, 370 N.E.2d 417 (1977).
With respect to the first state interest in preserving life, courts have held that the pa-
tient's right to self-determination is paramount. See Bartling, 163 Cal. App. 3d at 195-96,
209 Cal. Rptr. at 336. As the Bouvia court explained with some degree of passion:
We do not believe it is the policy of this State that all and every life must
be preserved against the will of the sufferer. It is incongruous, if not mon-
strous, for medical practitioners to assert their right to preserve a life that
someone else must live, or, more accurately, endure .... We cannot conceive
it to be the policy of this State to inflict such an ordeal upon anyone.
179 Cal. App. 3d at 1143-44, 225 Cal. Rptr. at 305. See also Drabick, 200 Cal. App. 3d at
209 n. 25, 245 Cal. Rptr. at 855 n. 25.
Likewise, the second state interest in preventing suicide has not prevailed because courts
have distinguished between acts of self-destruction and acts of self-determination which allow
death to occur by natural causes. See Bartling, 163 Cal. App. 3d at 196, 200 Cal. Rptr. at
225-26; Bouvia, 179 Cal. App. 3d at 1144-45, 225 Cal. Rptr. at 305-306.
The third state interest in the ethical standards of the medical profession has been viti-
ated by the courts' analyses of the first and second state interests. Moreover, if a protected
patient decision conflicts with the physician's ethics, the physician's personal beliefs can be
accommodated if the patient can be referred to another physician who wili follow the pa-
tient's instructions. Conservatorship of Morrison, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 533-34.
Finally, the fourth state interest in protecting innocent third parties is only implicated in
relatively rare situations: for example, when "the patient attempting to refuse treatment has
minor children who would be left without a parent should the treatment not proceed."
Baring, 163 Cal. App. 3d at 195 n.6, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 225 n.6 (citing In re President and
Directors of Georgetown Col. Inc., 331 F.2d 1000 (D.C. Cir.), reh'g denied, 331 F.2d 1010
(D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, Jones v. President and Directors of Georgetown Col., Inc., 377 U.S.
978 (1964)). In that type of situation, the state's interest in preserving life is based on the
rationale that a patient has a responsibility to the community to care for his or her child.
Georgetown, 331 F.2d at 1008.
97. Bouvia, 179 Cal. App. 3d at 1143, 225 Cal. Rptr. at 305.
98. See also Satz v. Perlmutter, 362 So. 2d 160 (1978), aff'd 379 So. 2d 359 (1980)
(right of terminally ill, competent adult to refuse or discontinue medical treatment protected
by constitutional right of privacy).
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developmentally disabled as well as comatose patients existing in a
persistent, vegetative state, courts have allowed treatment decisions
on behalf of such patients - including decisions to refuse life-sus-
taining care - to be made by family members, a legally appointed
guardian, or conservator.99 Thus, as an expression of the patient's
fundamental right to self-determination, the informed consent doc-
trine has become a vital principle of constitutional law.
2. Informed Consent and the Research Subject
In a parallel development, the principle of informed consent
has become the cornerstone of clinical research involving human
subjects. In this area, ethics and law have been driven by a number
of dramatic world and national events. Following World War II,
the Nuremberg trials revealed the Nazi atrocities committed in the
name of medical and scientific research."° From 1959 to 1962, a
number of infants were born with birth defects caused by an experi-
mental drug called Thalidomide.0 1 In 1966, an article by Dr.
Henry Beecher was published in the New England Journal of
Medicine exposing experimental abuse in American medicine.10 2 In
1972, the national press revealed a study, conducted for more than
40 years by the United States Public Health Service, in which 400
black males were allowed to remain untreated for syphilis.' Fur-
ther, legal regulation was spurred as biomedical research became
more institutionalized after World War II; the federal government
became a major source of research funding and the national re-
search effort grew rapidly."°
In response to these events, international guidelines, federal
regulations, and state law all sought to curtail experimental abuse
99. See Drabick, 200 Cal. App. 3d at 189, 193-200, 204-10, 245 Cal. Rptr. at 841, 844-
49, 851-56 (thoughtful analysis of effect of incompetence on privacy right to make medical
decisions as well as comprehensive review of case law approving decisions to forego life-
sustaining treatment made on behalf of permanently comatose patients existing in a persistent
vegetative state). See also Superintendent of Belchertown v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, 370
N.E.2d 417 (1977) (protecting privacy right of 67 year old man, with mental age of approxi-
mately two years, eight months, to forego life-prolonging chemotherapy).
100. See generally I, II Trials of War Criminals Before the Nuremberg Military Tribu-
nals Under Control Council Law No. 10 (1949) (proceedings from the medical case).
101. Taussig, A Study of the German Outbreak of Phocomelia: The Thalidomide Syn-
drome, 180 J. AMER. MED. Assoc. 1106-14 (1962).
102. Beecher, Ethics and Clinical Research, 274 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1354 (1966).
103. See generally Brandt, Racism and Research: The Case of the Tuskegee Syphilis
Study, 8 HASTINGS CTR. REP. 21 (Dec. 1978).
104. See President's Comm'n for the Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine and Bi-
omedical and Behavioral Research, Compensating for Research Injuries (1982) [hereinafter
Compensating for Research Injuries].
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through the principle of informed consent. The Nuremberg Code,
incorporated into the judgment of the Nuremberg court, established
that "[t]he voluntary consent of the human subject is absolutely es-
sential" to the ethical and legal conduct of human experimenta-
tion.1"' As the Code explained, this meant that "the person
involved ... should have sufficient knowledge ... of the subject
matter involved. . . to... make an understanding and enlightened
decision."106 The subject had to be informed of "the nature, dura-
tion, and purpose of the experiment; [and] the method and means
by which it [was] to be conducted." 10 7
In 1964, the Declaration of Helsinki was prepared by the
Eighteenth World Medical Assembly as an international guide to
physicians.108 As a basic principle, the Declaration stated:
In any research on human beings, each potential subject must be
adequately informed of the aims, methods, anticipated benefits
and potential hazards of the study and the discomfort it may en-
tail . . . The physician should then obtain the subject's freely-
given informed consent, preferably in writing.1
0 9
In 1974, the Department of Health and Human Services
("HHS") (then Health, Education and Welfare) promulgated its
first regulations applicable to all research either conducted or
funded by HHS involving human subjects.110 As thus regulated,
HHS research only can be approved if the informed consent of each
human subject is sought and documented.111 Moreover, like the
Nuremberg Code and Declaration of Helsinki, HHS regulations re-
quire a research subject to be informed of basic information such as
the following:
that the study involves research ... the purposes of the research
and the expected duration of the subject's participation... the
procedures to be followed.., any procedures which are experi-
mental... any reasonably foreseeable risks or discomforts to the
subject... [and] any benefits to the subject or to others which
may reasonably be expected from the research. 1 2
In 1978, the California legislature enacted the Protection of
105. II Trials of War Criminals, Before the Nuremberg Military Tribunals under Control
Council Law No. 10 181 (1949).
106. Id. at 182.
107. Id.
108. 271 NEw ENG. J. MED. 473 (1964).
109. Id.
110. 45 C.F.R. § 46.101 (1988).
111. Id. at § 46.111(a)(4) and (5).
112. Id. at § 46.116(a)(1)-(3).
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Human Subjects in Medical Experimentation Act which applies to
research immune from regulation by HHS. 113 This Act, like its in-
ternational and federal counterparts, provides that research involv-
ing a human subject can proceed only with the subject's informed
consent. 1 4  Also, the subject must be informed of the "nature and
purpose of the experiment . . [and] the procedures to be
followed."115
3. Informed Consent and John Moore
In John Moore's case, the principle of informed consent seems
to have been honored more in the breach than the observance. Con-
sidering Mr. Moore as a medical patient, the issue is whether Mr.
Moore's physician had a duty to disclose the commercial potential
of Mr. Moore's spleen or other body tissues before Mr. Moore con-
sented to the splenectomy or to any other procedure in which tissue
may have been removed as part of his follow-up care. An argument
against disclosure can be made on the ground that any facts regard-
ing the commercial value of Mr. Moore's tissue were irrelevant to
the risks and benefits of any medical procedure related to the treat-
ment of hairy-cell leukemia. Hence, Mr. Moore would not have to
be informed of his tissue's commercial value in order to make an
informed treatment decision. 1 6 The argument for disclosure fol-
lows a more expansive view of the informed consent doctrine.
"[T]he patient's right of self-decision is the measure of the physi-
cian's duty to reveal."11 7 Hence, although a physician necessarily
retains some discretion in assessing what a patient needs to know,
the physician's discretion must always be exercised in the patient's
best interest.118
Given these basic tenets, it seems that Dr. Golde should have
113. CAL. HEALTH & SA-ETY CODE §§ 24170-24179.5 (Deering 1988).
114. Id. at § 24175.
115. Id. at § 24172(a),(b). All clinical investigations regulated by the federal Food and
Drug Administration (including investigations of new drugs, medical devices, and biological
products for human use) are subject to informed consent requirements which are substan-
tially similar to HHS requirements. See 21 C.F.R. Part 50 §§ 50.1-50.27 (1988).
116. For an argument concluding that tissue excised for therapeutic reasons may be used
in research without further consent because there is no further risk to the patient, see Wag-
ner, The Legal Impact of Patient Materials Used for Product Development in the Biomedical
Industry, 33 CUN. REs. 444, 446 (Oct. 1985).
117. Cobbs, 8 Cal. 3d at 245, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 515.
118. See id. at 242, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 513 ("The patient, being unlearned in medical
sciences, has an abject dependence upon and trust in his physician for the information upon
which he relies during the decisional process, thus raising an obligation in the physician that
transcends arms-length transactions"). See also id. at 245-46, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 516 (The
therapeutic privilege, that is, the phyician's privilege to withhold information during the in-
[Vol. 5
TOWARD AN ORGANIC VIEW
told Mr. Moore about the commercial value of Mr. Moore's own
body tissue. According to Mr. Moore's allegations, Dr. Golde and
Ms. Quan became aware of his tissue's unique commercial potential
prior to his splenectomy. Nevertheless, Mr. Moore was neither in-
formed of this fact nor of the efforts which would begin after sur-
gery to exploit his tissue. Mr. Moore was dependent on Dr. Golde
for medical information. Dr. Golde, in turn, had a fiduciary obliga-
tion to disclose material information to Mr. Moore; and, the fact
that Mr. Moore's tissue was so unusual seems material (at the very
least) to Mr. Moore's general medical situation.
Mr. Moore's experience as a research subject compels a similar
conclusion. About seven years after Mr. Moore's splenectomy, Mr.
Moore consented to the removal of other tissues for use in a re-
search project. Mr. Moore was not informed of any facts regarding
the commercial exploitation of his tissue-even though a patent ap-
plication based on his cell line was pending and Dr. Golde had en-
tered into development agreements with Genetics and Sandoz. The
consent form simply stated that the "study [would] provide infor-
mation which may aid the medical profession and other scientists in
the understanding of how the body defends itself against dis-
ease."' 19 This description appears woefully inadequate if, as Mr.
Moore contends, his tissue was withdrawn to further the commer-
cial exploitation of his cell line. A generalized statement regarding
the body's defense against disease simply does not amount to any
kind of meaningful disclosure of the real research effort, namely, the
development of a cell line which would support a potentially multi-
billion dollar product line.
This sleight of hand violates the universal research canon that
informed consent depends on understanding the true nature and
purpose of the research. Also, the consent form seems to offend the
federal requirement of disclosing "any benefits to the subject or to
others which may reasonably be expected from the research."' 1
20
formed consent process if that would be in the patient's best interest, must be exercised in a
way that is "consistent with... the 'fiducial qualities' of the physician-patient relationship").
After reviewing both sides of the. disclosure issue, the Office of Technology Assessment
determined that "[it will be up to the courts or state legislatures to decide whether the possi-
bility of commercial gain for any interested party requires disclosure where diagnostic tests or
active treatment is contemplated." Ownership of Human Tissues, supra note 5, at 103-104.
119. Moore, 249 Cal. Rptr. at 531 (consent form attached as Appendix B to court's
opinion).
120. 45 C.F.R. § 46.116(a)(3)(1988). Assuming arguendo that Dr. Golde's research was
funded by HHS, the removal of body tissue for use in research appears to be an "interven-
tion" subject to HHS' informed consent requirements. H1-IS' regulations provide that "no
investigator may involve a human being as a subject in research covered by these regulations
1989]
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Again, the abstract benefit which the form describes ("understand-
ing... how the body defends itself against disease") hardly begins
to suggest the very concrete benefits, commercial and otherwise,
which were expected from research regarding the Mo line.121
Such infractions of the informed consent process violate the
autonomy of the research subject. In theory, the informed consent
of the research subject is sought to create a partnership between the
subject and investigator in the common pursuit of knowledge.1 22
Research serves the common good, and the voluntary participation
of the human subject allows the subject to participate in a common
pursuit. Without this kind of participation, without such fully in-
formed and freely given consent, the subject becomes a mere thing
wh6m others act on and manipulate in the course of an experimen-
tal procedure.1 23
Further, the principle of informed consent serves to balance
individual and societal needs. Research, as stated, is designed to
serve the common good, to benefit the needs of the many through
the'general advancement of human -knowledge.1 24  The informed
consent process, however, is designed to ensure that the good of the
many is not achieved at the expense of the one. 125 When the indi-
unless the investigator has obtained the legally effective informed consent of the subject...
45 C.F.R. § 46.116. As defined in the regulations, "'[h]uman subject' means a living individ-
ual about whom an investigator ... conducting research obtains ... data through interven-
tion. . . . 'Intervention' includes ... physical procedures by which data are gathered (for
example, venipuncture) . I..." d. at § 46.102(f).
121. For a good overview of the manner in which HHS regulations might be interpreted,
applied, and revised to deal with the disclosure of potential commercial gain, see Ownership of
Human Tissues, supra note 5, at 102-110. In general, this government study appears to sup-
port disclosure in "those instances where there is a significant probability of commercial gain
(i.e., a high probabilityor certainty of a marketable biological material being extracted) aris-
ing from the use of human tissues and cells from an identified research subject." Id. at 107.
122. See Ramsey, The Ethics of a Cottage Industry in an Age of Community and Re-
search Medicine, 284 NEW ENG. J. MED. 700, 705 (Apr. 1971).
123. See H. JONAS, PHILOSOPHICAL REFLECTIONS ON EXPERIMENTING WITH HUMAN
SUBJECTS, EXPERIMENTATION WITH HUMAN SUBJECTS 1, 2-4, 13-14 (P. Freund ed. 1969).
124. See id. at 13-14; Compensating for Research Injuries, supra note 104, at 11-12.
125. Research is justified by utilitarianism which, simply put, seeks to achieve the great-
est good for the greatest number of individuals. See generally T. MAPPES & J. ZEMBATY,
BIOMEDICAL ETHICS 6-17, 175 (2d ed. 1986). The principle of informed consent, however,
directly follows from the ethics of Immanuel Kant (1724-1804). See id. at 20-21, 176. Based
on the "Categorical Imperative," Kantian deontology includes the directive to " '[a]ct in such
a way that you always treat humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of any
other, never simply as a means, but always at the same time as an end.'" Id. at 17 (quoting I.
KANT, GROUNDWORK OP THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 96 (H. Paton trans. 1964)). Thus,
rather than an ethic based on the consequence of human action, this principle supports an
ethic based on duty (to self and others) and respect for the inherent dignity of individuals.
See id. at 18-22.
In the research setting, the principle of informed consent is designed to ensure that re-
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vidual is subordinated to the abstract needs of "progress," the les-
sons of history demonstrate the dire results.
Finally, when a medical patient serves as a research subject,
the informed consent process may guard against the abuse which is
possible when a medical doctor functions as both a treating physi-
cian and scientific investigator. Medical patients who may ever har-
bor the hope of recovery, are especially vulnerable research
subjects.126 Medical doctors functioning in a dual capacity may be
torn in two directions, consciously or unconsciously, and the pa-
tient's best interests may not always coincide with the constraints
imposed by a specific research protocol.127
This conflict was apparent in Moore. As a phygician, Dr.
Golde was responsible for the treatment of Mr. Moore's medical
condition (hairy-cell leukemia). As a scientist, Dr. Golde was inter-
ested in the development of a unique cell line. Moreover, in Mr.
Moore's case, Dr. Golde functioned in yet another capacity,
namely, as an entrepreneur of the new biotechnology industry. In-
deed, during the approximately seven years that Mr. Moore tray-
search subjects are treated as ends and respected as persons. Thus, the informed consent
doctrine serves as a deontological balance to utilitarian research goals. See id. at 176. For a
discussion of research ethics incorporating these principles, see Ramsey, supra note 122, at
704-705.
126. This point is illustrated by a poignant passage from The Cancer Ward, a novel by
Alexander Solzhenitsyn:
How he craved to be healed!-despite those harrowing months and years
of by now hopeless treatments, he would suddenly recover completely. His
back would heal and he would stand up straight and walk with a firm step,
feeling like a new man. Greetings, Dr. Lyudmila Afanasyevna! I'm well--see?
How they all craved to hear of such a wonder-working doctor, of a
medicine unknown to the doctors here! These people might have admitted or
denied that they believed in such a thing, but all of them, to a man, felt, deep in
their hearts, that there really was such a doctor, such a dispenser of herbs or
such an old village woman living somewhere, and that they only had to learn
where, take that medicine, and they would be saved.
It was impossible that their lives were already doomed!
Laugh as we may at miracles as long as we are strong, healthy and flour-
ishing, let life become hopelessly wedged and crushed so that only a miracle
can save us-and we shall believe in that one and only and altogether ex-
traordinary miracle.
A. SOLZHENITSYN, THE CANCER WARD 164 (1968). See also A. CAPRON, THE LAW OF
GENETIC THERAPY IN THE NEW GENETICS AND THE FUTuRE or MAN 133, 150-52 (M.
Hamilton ed. 1972).
127. See, eg., Case Studies- When Research Is Best Therapy, 18 HASTINGS CTR. RiT. 24
(Apr./May 1988); False Data & The Therapeutic Misconception: Two Urgent Problems in
Research Ethics, 17 HASTINGS CTR. RFr. 16 (Apr. 1987) (hereinafter False Data).
The dynamics of the informed consent process must be evaluated carefully in any given
situation to ensure the quality of an individual's consent. See, eg., False Data id. at 21-24; F.
Ingelfinger, Informed (But Uneducated) Consent, 287 NEW ENG. J. MED. 465-66 (1972).
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eled from Washington to UCLA for further withdrawals of tissue,
Dr. Golde (together with Ms. Quan) applied for a patent based on
Mr. Moore's cell line and entered into development contracts for
his own personal gain.
In light of these facts, Mr. Moore claims that his follow-up
visits to UCLA were not really for his medical treatment; instead,
they were designed to facilitate the commercial exploitation of his
cell line. One wonders: Was Dr. Golde primarily motivated by the
best interests of his patient? Or, was he driven by the quest for fame
and fortune? Professional fame is the traditional reward of scien-
tific research128 and great fortune is the new reward of biotechnol-
ogy. 129 Both are powerful attractions.
The principle of informed consent thus required Dr. Golde to
tell Mr. Moore about the commercial value of his cell line. Una-
ware of the special nature of his cell line, Mr. Moore became an
object of research instead of a research subject. There was no true
partnership between Mr. Moore and Dr. Golde. To the contrary,
Mr. Moore's autonomy was subordinated to Dr. Golde's own re-
search goals and the lure of profits estimated at more than $3 billion
by 1990.130
C. The Right of Privacy, Property, And The Commercial
Use of Human Tissue
1. The Right of Privacy and The Right To Consent to
the Commercial Use of One's Own Tissue
As a tort law doctrine, the right of privacy developed through
128. See generally Eisenberg, Proprietary Rights and the Norms of Science in Biotechnol-
ogy Research, 97 YALE L.J. 177, 181-84 (1987).
129. See supra notes 44-48 and accompanying text.
130. Several commentators support the medical patient's or research subject's right to
give an informed consent to the commercial use of his or her body tissue, but either suggest
that sales of tissue should be banned as a matter of policy, see Caplan, Blood, Sweat, Tears,
and Profits: The Ethics of the Sale and Use of Patient Derived Materials in Biomedicine, 33
CLINICAL Ras. 448, 450-51 (Oct. 1985), or that the consent process should be revised to
include a specific waiver of the patient's or subject's interest in any commercial gain derived
from the research. See Levine, Research that Could Yield Marketable Products from Human
Materials: The Problem of Informed Consent, 8 I.R.B. 6 (Jan./Feb. 1986); Rosenberg, Using
Patient Materials for Product Development: A Dean's Perspective, 33 CLINICAL RES. 452, 453
(Oct. 1985). Ironically, one commentator who concludes that John Moore probably would
not have an informed consent claim, also concludes on other grounds that Mr. Moore has a
strong claim for compensation. See Danforth, Cells, Sales, and Royalties: The Patient's Right
to a Portion of the Profits, 6 YALE L. & PoL'Y REv. 179 (1988).
For a good summary of the economic considerations bearing on the policy issue of
whether payment for biological materials should be required, see Ownership of Human Tis-
sues, supra note 5, at 115-25.
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the common law. Given the basic nature of the right as well as the
kind of situations where the right has been protected, the privacy
right seems broad enough to include a right to consent to the com-
mercial use of one's own body tissue. Further, if this particular as-
pect of privacy is recognized, the privacy right would further affirm
our basic values of individual autonomy and self-determination.
During the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the
privacy right was recognized as a counterpoint to technology. The
means of communication had become more sophisticated and pri-
vate lives were ever more "subject[ ] . . . to exploitation by those
who pander[ed] to commercialism and to prurient and idle curios-
ity." 131  Hence, courts realized the time had come to protect the
individual's "personality" from "encroachment" and to preserve his
or her "spiritual nature" and "feelings" as inviolate. 32 Thus, rec-
ognized as the right "to be let alone,"' 13 3 the privacy right "con-
cerns one's ... peace of mind"' 34 and protects one's right "to be
free of unauthorized and unwarranted publicity."' 35
As the privacy doctrine developed through case law, Dean
Prosser (the famous authority on tort law) observed that four differ-
ent kinds of wrongs were identified as privacy torts: (1) intrusion
into another's seclusion, solitude, or private affairs, (2) public dis-
closure of embarrassing, private facts about another, (3) publicity
putting another in a false light in the public eye, and (4) appropria-
tion of another's name or likeness for one's own advantage. 36 This
131. Gill v. Curtis Publishing Co., 38 Cal. 2d 273, 277, 239 P.2d 630 (1952) (quoting 41
AM. JuR. IST Privacy § 9).
132. Id.
133. Lugosi v. Universal Pictures, 25 Cal. 3d 813, 819, 160 Cal. Rptr. 323, 326, 603 P.2d
425 (1979); Gill, 38 Cal. 2d at 276; Melvin v. Reid, 112 Cal. App. 285, 289, 297 P. 91 (1931).
134. Fairfield v. American Photocopy Equip. Co., 138 Cal. App. 2d 82, 86, 291 P.2d 194
(1955).
135. Id. As a distinct tort law doctrine, the right of privacy can be traced to the seminal
law review article by Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis, entitled "The Right of Privacy"
and published in 1890. (Warren & Brandeis, The Right of Privacy, 4 HARv. L. REv. 193
(1890).) See W. PROSSER, LAw OF TORTS § 117 at 802-804 (4th ed. 1971) [hereinafter PROS-
SER, TORTS].
136. Lugosi, 25 Cal. 3d at 819, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 326 (quoting Prosser, Privacy, 48 CAL.
L. REV. 383, 389 (1960)); Eastwood v. Superior Court, 149 Cal. App. 3d 409, 416, 198 Cal.
Rptr. 342, 346 (1983) (citing Prosser, Privacy, 48 CAL. L. REv. 383, 384 (1960)).
CAL. CiV. CODE § 3344 is a statutory complement to Dean Prosser's fourth category of
cases (appropriation of name or likeness). Lugosi, 25 Cal. 3d at 819 n.6, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 326
n.6; Eastwood, 149 Cal. App. 3d at 416-17, 198 Cal. Rptr. at 346. Adopted in 1971, section
3344 creates a statutory scheme to redress the use of "another's name, voice, signature, pho-
tograph, or likeness, in any manner, on or in products, merchandise, or goods, or for pur-
poses of advertising or selling, or soliciting purchases of, products, merchandise, goods or
services, without such person's prior consent." CAL. CIv. CODE § 3344(a).
In some ways, the statutory action is more limited than the common law action. It
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last category is not confined to the wrongful use of another's name
or likeness per se. To be sure, many early cases were based on the
fact that an individual's name or likeness was used, without his or
her consent, to promote the sale of some product.137 More gener-
ally, however, the wrong lies in the unauthorized exploitation of
another's personality or identity. 138  Hence, the imitation of Bette
Midler's voice as part of an advertising campaign has been held to
be an actionable invasion of privacy.1 39
Conversely, the "right of publicity" is concerned with one's
ability to capitalize on commercial opportunities for it protects the
right to exploit any commercial value in one's name, likeness, or
personality. 1" Indeed, as the United States Supreme Court recog-
requires a knowing use of another's attributes while a mistaken or inadvertent use may be
actionable under the common law. Eastwood, 149 Cal. App. 3d at 417, 417 n.6, 198 Cal.
Rptr. at 346 n.6, 346-47. Also, the statutory action appears limited to the attributes listed by
statute while a common law action is not. See Midler v. Ford Motor Co., 849 F.2d 460, 463
(9th Cir. 1988). On the other hand, section 3344(a) provides for a more liberal remedial
scheme than the common law. See infra note 193.
137. See generally PROSSER, TORTS, supra note 135, § 117, at 804-807.
138. See Fairfield, 138 Cal. App. 2d at 86; Midler, 849 F.2d at 463 (quoting Mot-
schenbacher v. R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 498 F.2d 821, 824 (9th Cir. 1974)). See generally
PROSSER, TORTS, supra note 135, § 117, at 805 ("[it is the plaintiff's name as a symbol of his
identity that is involved here") (emphasis added).
139. Midler, 849 F.2d at 460.
140. See Lugosi, 25 Cal. 3d at 819, 824, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 326, 329; Guglielmi v. Spelling-
Goldberg Prods., 25 Cal. 3d 860, 861, 160 Cal. Rptr. 352, 353, 603 P.2d 454 (1979); East-
wood, 149 Cal. App. 3d at 419, 198 Cal. Rptr. at 348; Accord Carson v. Here's Johnny Porta-
ble Toilets, Inc., 698 F.2d 831, 834-37 (6th Cir. 1983) (Michigan law) (right of publicity
protects commercial exploitation of identity and is not limited to protection of name or like-
ness per se); Martin Luther King, Jr., Center for Social Change, Inc. v. American Heritage
Prods., Inc., 694 F.2d 674, 676-80 (1lth Cir. 1983) (Georgia law); Factors Etc., Inc. v. Pro
Arts, Inc., 579 F.2d 215, 220-22 (2d Cir. 1978)(New York law), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 908
(1979); Haelan Laboratories, Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 202 F.2d 866, 868 (2d Cir.
1953) (New York law), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 816 (1953); Winterland Concessions Co. v.
Sileo, 528 F. Supp. 1201, 1213 (N.D. Il. 1981) (Illinois law), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, and
remanded, Winterland Concessions Co. v. Trela, 735 F.2d 257 (7th Cir. 1984) (reversal and
remand only affecting antitrust counterclaim).
A statutory right of publicity also exists in California. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 990(a)
(Deering Supp. 1989). As defined by statute, a "'deceased personality' means any natural
person whose name, voice, signature, photograph, or likenes§ has commercial value at the
time of his or her death, whether or not during the lifetime of that natural person the person
used his or her name, voice, signature, photograph or likeness" for a commercial purpose.
Id. at § 990(h).
The rights created by statute may be transferred freely either before or after the death of
the deceased personality. Id. at § 990(b). If the deceased personality does not transfer these
rights, they descend to the surviving spouse, children, grandchildren, or parents of the de-
ceased personality. Id. at § 990(d). If the deceased personality does not effect any such trans-
fers and there are no surviving heirs, the rights terminate. Id. at § 999(e). Finally, even if the
statutory publicity rights are transferred or inherited, they expire 50 years from the death of
the deceased personality. Id. at § 9 9 0(g). (Likewise, federal copyright protection for works
1989] TOWARD AN ORGANIC VIEW
nized in Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co.,141 the right
of publicity is not merely concerned with the appropriation of an-
other's "reputation to enhance the attractiveness of a commercial
product;"14 2 the right extends more broadly to protect the economic
value of one's talents or livelihood.143 Thus, the Court held that the
unauthorized broadcast of a human cannonball act (where an indi-
vidual made a living being shot from a cannon into a net), violated
the individual's right of publicity and-was not privileged by the first
and fourteenth amendments. 144"
Examined closely, the right of publicity really appears to be a
species of the right of privacy, rather than an entirely separate inter-
est.14 To begin with, both the right of publicity and right of pri-
vacy are based on the individual's interest in the attributes of his or
her own personality.14" Furthermore, whether the right of publicity
or right of privacy is violated, the gravamen of the tort is the same:
An individual's identity has been used without his or her consent
for another's advantage. Hence, the only real difference between the
right of publicity and right of privacy seems to be whether one seeks
to exploit or to prevent the public use of his or her identity. In the
former instance, the right is used offensively as a sword; in the latter
instance, the right is used defensively as a shield.14 7 In either event,
both rights protect the individual's right to decide what use another
created on or after January 1, 1978 endures for "the life of the author and fifty years after the
author's death." 17 U.S.C.A. § 302(a) (West 1977)).
The statutory right of publicity differs from the common law right recognized in Lugosi.
Among other things, the common law right must be exercised, if at all, during the individ-
ual's lifetime and is not descendible. See Lugosi, 25 Cal. 3d at 822-24, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 328-
29. See also infra notes 199-205 and accompanying text.
141. Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562 (1977) (discussing
Ohio law).
142. Id. at 576.
143. See id. at 569, 576.
144. See id. at 574-79.
145. See Factors, Eta, 579 F.2d at 220 (right of publicity analyzed under the "appropria-
tion" branch of the common law right of privacy); See also Winterland, 528 F. Supp. at 1213.
("One of the species of the right of privacy recognized by the cases and the commentators is
the right of publicity.").
146. See Lugosi, 25 Cal. 3d at 824, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 329:
The so-called right of publicity means in essence that the reaction of the public
to [a] name and likeness... endows the name and likeness of the person in-
volved with commercially exploitable opportunities. The protection of [the]
name and likeness from unwarranted intrusion or exploitation is the heart of
the law of privacy.
147. See American Heritage Products, 694 F.2d at 678-79 (court's discussion of Haelan
illustrates use of right as offensive sword while discussion of Palmer v. Schonhom Enters.,
Inc., 96 N.J. Super. 72, 232 A.2d 458 (1967), illustrates use of right as defensive shield).
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shall make of his or her personal attributes. 148
Based on the privacy and publicity case law, it seems that John
Moore's right to consent to the commercial use of his own tissue
can be recognized as an aspect of the common law right of privacy.
With respect to legal doctrine, there does not seem to be any need to
create a new tort to protect the interest at stake. Further, with re-
spect to facts and public policy, the situation in Moore is analogous
to the privacy and publicity cases in at least several ways.
First, Mr. Moore's tissues and cell line were used without his
knowledge or consent for others' economic and professional gain.149
Secondly, Mr. Moore's tissue, with the genetic code it contains, can
be considered an attribute of Mr. Moore's identity. As the Court of
Appeal queried in the Moore opinion: "If the courts have found a
sufficient proprietary interest in one's persona, how could one not
have a right in one's own genetic material, something far more pro-
foundly the essence of one's human uniqueness than a name or a
face?"' 150 Likewise, by analogy to the Zacchini decision: If the
right of publicity protects the economic value of a unique talent,
shouldn't the law protect the economic value of a unique genetic
code? Both questions seem properly rhetorical.'
Thirdly, the publicity right furthers public policies which
should be furthered in Moore. As described by the Zacchini Court,
the right of publicity protects the individual's incentive to create
148. Some courts have distinguished between the right of publicity and the right of pri-
vacy on the ground that the former is concerned with the commercial value of one's identity
or "persona" and can be transferred, while the latter is concerned with the right "to be let
alone" or with one's feelings and cannot be transferred. See Carson, 698 F.2d at 834; Bi-rite
Enters., Inc. v. Button Master, 555 F. Supp. 1188, 1199-1200 (S.D.N.Y. 1983), 578 F. Supp.
59 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (supplemental opinion regarding damages). The more fundamental fact
seems to be that both rights are concerned with the individual's right to control the commer-
cial use of his or her personal attributes. Moreover, if the right of publicity were recognized
as a species of the right of'privacy, just as the othei categories identified by Dean Prosser,
there does not seem to be any reason why the publicity interest alone could not be deemed a
commercial, transferable interest.
The protection provided by privacy and publicity law is similar to the protection pro-
vided by unfair competition law which prevents the "passing off" of a fictional character, i.e.,
the portrayal of a character in such a way that the public is likely to be deceived as to the
lawful creator or proprietor of the character. See Lone Ranger, Inc. v. Cox, 124 F.2d 650,
652-54 (4th Cir. 1942) (the "Lone Ranger" character, of radio fame, wrongfully used in
circus).
149. See supra notes 49-67 and accompanying text.
150. Moore, 249 Cal. Rptr. at 508.
151. As the Ninth Circuit has observed, "It would be wholly unrealistic to deny that a
name, likeness, or other attribute of identity can have commercial value." Motschenbacher v.
R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 498 F.2d 821, 824 n.10 (9th'Cir. 1974). Likewise, in the present
context, it would be wholly unrealistic to deny that a cell line can have commercial value.
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something of public interest and thereby serve the public good. 15 2
The same reasoning underlies the patent and copyright laws,1 3 and
seems equally compelling when biomedical research is involved.
Research serves the common good and biomedical research depends
on the willing participation of human subjects. Human subjects
play an especially distinct role in research when they bring a unique
product to the research enterprise. Hence, for research to proceed
most fruitfully, it seems necessary to encourage the participation of
research subjects by protecting the economic value of their special
contributions to the research effort. 1
54
Finally, if the right to consent to the commercial use of one's
own cell line is recognized as an incident of the common law right
of privacy, the rights of physical autonomy and self-determination
will be enhanced. As discussed above, these rights are basic to our
jurisprudence and underpin the principle of informed consent.
Hence, the privacy right urged here would conform to other areas
of law which incorporate the informed consent doctrine, namely,
negligence law (structuring the doctor-patient relationship),l"I state
constitutional law (protecting the patient's right to make medical
decisions free from unwarranted interference),' 56 and statutory and
regulatory law (protecting the rights of human research subjects
and imposing new duties of disclosure on scientific investigators). 157
Likewise, the rights of physical autonomy and self-determina-
tion are basic to the constitutional right of privacy established by
federal law. The United States Supreme Court has recognized the
right of every individual to determine what shall be done with his or
her own body. As early as 1891, the Court stated: "No right is
held more sacred, or is more carefully guarded, by the common law,
than the right of every individual to the possession and control of
his own person, free from all restraint or interference of others, un-
152. Zacchini, 433 U.S. at 576-78.
153. Id. at 576.
154. In Zacchini, the Court also observed that the right of publicity would protect the
time, effort, and expense invested in the individual's performance and indeed would provide
the individual with a form of compensation for his labor. See id. at 575-76.
This rationale can be applied to the commercial use of human tissue. An individual
must invest some time undergoing the procedure(s) through which tissue is removed. More-
over, the procedure may involve some expense or inconvenience as well as some degree of
pain or discomfort. Hence, although an individual's livelihood may not be jeopardized by the
commercial exploitation of his or her tissue, the individual does make a personal investment
in the process.
155. See supra notes 74-90 and accompanying text.
156. See supra notes 91-99 and accompanying text.
157. See supra notes 100-115 and accompanying text.
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less by clear and unquestionable authority of law."15 In 1973, the
Court recognized this "sacred" right as part of the personal privacy
protected by the United States Constitution. 159 Although the limits
of personal privacy are not always easy to define, as indicated by the
long, bitter abortion debate, the right of privacy has become synon-
ymous with individual autonomy and self-determination. 160 The
privacy right urged here would be consistent with these values.
2. Privacy as a Property Right
Moore has sparked a debate as to whether body tissue can be
considered a form of property. 61 In Lugosi, the California
Supreme Court considered the issue of whether one's name and
likeness are a form of "property."162 Although the court turned to
the principles of privacy law to protect the right to exploit these
attributes, the court said the property debate was " 'pointless.' "1,63
As a practical matter, the court concluded that once the publicity
right was recognized, it was valuable and could be licensed and pro-
158. Union Pac. Ry. Co. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891).
159. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152, reh'g denied, 410 U.S. 959 (1973).
160. See eg., Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 684-85 (1977) ("This right
of personal privacy includes 'the interest in independence in making certain kinds of deci-
sions.'. . . While the outer limits of this aspect of privacy have not been marked by the Court,
it is clear that among the decisions that an individual may make without unjustified govern-
ment interference are personal decisions 'relating to marriage... procreation ... contracep-
tion ... family relationship... and child rearing and education .......") (citations omitted);
Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972) ("If the right of privacy meais anything, it is
the right of the individual, married or single, to be free from unwarranted governmental
intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or
beget a child") (emphasis in original). See alo Bouvia v. County of Los Angeles, 195 Cal.
App. 3d 1075, 1085, 241 Cal. Rptr. 239, 245 (1987) ("The right of bodily self-determination
is a basic societal concept and is well rooted in the common law").
161. Compare Danforth, supra note 130, at 192-95 (arguing for a property right in the
body) and Note, Toward the Right of Commerciality; Recognizing Property Rights in the Com-
mercial Value of Human Tissue, 34 UCLA L.REv. 207 (1986) (arguing for a limited property
right, i.e., a right in the commercial value of the body, to be known as the "right of com-
merciality") and Andrews, My Body, My Property, 16 HASTINGS CmT. RPT. 28 (Oct. 1986)
(arguing for a property or quasi-property right whereby individuals would not be treated as
property but would "have the autonomy to treat their own parts as property, particularly
their regenerative parts") with Wagner, Human Tissue Research: Who Owns the Results?, 3 S
C COMPUTER & HIGH TECH L. J. 231 (1987) (arguing against "implied reservation of inter-
est" in tissue lawfully removed from the human body) and Murray, Who Owns the Body? On
the Ethics of Using Human Tissue for Commercial Purposes, 8 I.R.B. 1, 5 (1986) (arguing
against a property right in the body but for compensation to individuals when tissue is com-
mercialized, based on "the dignity of the human body and its parts, and the gift relationship
between science and the public").
162. See Lugosi, 25 Cal. 3d at 816-19, 823, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 325-326, 329.
163. Id. at 819, 823-24, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 326, 329 (citing Prosser, Privacy, supra note
136, at 406).
[Vol. 5
TOWARD AN ORGANIC VIEW
tected from invasion." Although the debate in Moore also may be
pointless, it seems important for the impact it may have on our per-
ception of human dignity.
In Moore, the Court of Appeal analyzed the property debate,
concluding that one's "bodily tissues amount[] to personal prop-
erty" and that one does have "a property right in his own tissue." 165
Hence, the unauthorized exploitation of one's body tissue would
support a cause of action for conversion.16 6 Conversion consists of
an unauthorized act interfering with another's rights in personal
property.167 Therefore, the commercial exploitation of another's
body tissue, without the individual's consent, would interfere with
the individual's rights of dominion and control over his or her own
body.16
8
The court's argument was serious and persuasive: In theory,
property is broadly defined as a collection of ownership rights. 69
The ownership of one's own body is dramatically different from the
ownership of another's body, and thus cannot be outlawed as slav-
ery.'7 0 A limited property interest has been recognized in dead bod-
ies for burial purposes, and body tissues are treated as property
which can be donated (by will or other means) for use in organ
transplants or other scientific endeavors.' 7 ' The court's analysis,
however, appears flawed in one fundamental respect: The right to
consent to the commercial use of one's body seems better under-
stood as the cornerstone of a privacy interest in one's own body
rather than a property interest. 7 2
The equation of human tissue with personal property inevita-
bly seems to carry the connotation that tissue is some kind of com-
164. Id. at 819, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 326.
165. Moore, 249 Cal. Rptr. at 504.
166. Id.
167. See id. at 503-04.
168. See id. at 504-11.
169. Id. at 504-06.
170. Id. at 504.
171. Id. at 506.
172. Indeed, in its opinion in Moore, the Court of Appeal drew directly from privacy law
to support its conclusions regarding property law. Citing Bouvia v. Superior Court, 179 Cal.
App. 3d 1127, 1139, 225 Cal. Rptr. 297, 302 (1986), for the principle that every adult of
sound mind has the right to control his own body, the Moore court defined this right as a
property interest. See Moore, 249 Cal. Rptr. at 505-06.
Moreover, the approach suggested here is supported by the legal status given dead bodies
which are not treated as property per se. Cohen v. Groman Mortuary, Inc., 231 Cal. App. 2d
1, 41 Cal. Rptr. 481, 483, 484 (1964). To be sure, there is a "quasi property right" in a corpse
(emphasis in original), but this right only refers to the right to have custody of the corpse for
purpose of burial. In other words, in the absence of any testamentary disposition, the next of
kin have the right (and duty) to bury a corpse or otherwise dispose of its remains.
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modity.1 "3 In other words, when defined as personal property,
human tissue seems to become an ordinary good or chattel which,
like other kinds of merchandise, can be bought and sold in the mar-
ketplace.174 Further, this perception will be reinforced as other
property doctrines are applied to the acquisition and disposition of
human tissue.
175
As an alternative analysis, a property right may be located in
the right to control the commercial use of one's own tissue, a right
arguably protected by the right of privacy. As the Court of Appeal
observed in Moore, a property right is essentially an ownership
right, that is, a right to exclusive use and possession; property per se
is anything subject to ownership."1 6 Under this broad definition,
property may be real or personal, and personal property may be
tangible or intangible. 177 Intangible personal property, in turn, may
consist of an abstract right such as a contract right,178 a license, 7 9 a
cause of action18 (or right to sue), and evidence of a debt (or right
to recover money).181 Moreover, intangible personal property in-
cludes the "rights created or granted by statute," 182 as well as
"'every species of right and interest capable of being enjoyed as
such upon which it is practicable to place a money value.' ,183
Rights which are directly analogous to the right to consent to
the commercial use of one's own tissue have been recognized as
property. After Lugosi was decided, the California legislature cre-
ated a specific property right in the right to use a name, voice, sig-
173. See ag., Moore, 249 Cal. Rptr. at 533-34 (George, AJ. dissenting); Note, Toward
the Right of Commerciality, supra note 161, at 262-63 (arguing that a new "right of com-
merciality," as opposed to an absolute property right in the body, would avoid treating the
body as a commodity); Murray, supra note 161 (general argument against treatment of body
as commodity).
174. See Moore, 249 Cal. Rptr. at 533-34 (George, A.J. dissenting).
175. See id. at 534-35; Note, Toward the Right of Commerciality, supra note 161, at 242-
58 (discussing application of traditional property law doctrines to the human body).
176. See Moore, 249 Cal. Rptr. at 504-05; See also CAL. CIV. CODE § 654 (Deering
1971).
177. See Moore, 249 Cal. Rptr. at 505; CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 57, 663.
178. Yuba River Power Co. v. Nevada Irrigation Dist., 207 Cal. 521, 523, 279 P. 128
(1929).
179. Golden v. State of California, 133 Cal. App. 2d 640, 643-44, 285 P.2d 49 (1955)
(general on-sale liquor license is property).
180. CAL. CIV. CODE § 14, subd. 3 (Deering 1971); Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 7, subd. 3
(Deering 1972).
181. Id.
182. Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 655 (Deering 1973).
183. Yuba River Power, 207 Cal. at 523 (quoting 22 R.C.L., § 10, at 43) (quoted in
Moore, 249 Cal. Rptr. at 505).
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nature, photograph, or likeness for a commercial purpose.'" 4
Following the enactment of this statute, the individual's common
law fights in the attributes of his or her identity have been consid-
ered property.18 5 Finally, a property right in the right to practice
one's occupation or profession has long been recognized,1 16 even
though one's personal knowledge or skill is not considered
property. 187
Hence, it seems that the right to consent to the commercial use
of one's own tissue may be defined as a form of intangible personal
property without in any way violating established property doc-
trines or diminishing our respect for an individual's unique worth.
3. Incidents of a Property Right in Privacy
If the right to consent to the commercial use of one's own tis-
sue is recognized as a property right, at least three incidents of own-
ership would follow: (1) the right to license the commercial use of
one's tissue; (2) the right to sue for unauthorized commercial use;
and (3) subject to the principles of informed consent, the right to
transfer any commercial rights in tissue removed from one's
body. 88 Arguably, too, the right would be descendible.
First, the right to license the commercial use of one's tissue
follows from the very nature of a property right. Property is the
subject of ownership, and ownership is defined as the right "to pos-
sess and use [a thing] to the exclusion of others."18 9 Hence, in Lu-
gosi, the California Supreme Court recognized the right of publicity
as a "right of value" which could be licensed. 9 ' Likewise, if the
right to consent to the commercial use of one's own tissue is defined
as a property right, then one necessarily has the right to license the
commercial use of his or her own tissue.
Secondly, the right to authorize the commercial use of one's
184. CAL. CIV. CODE § 990(b) (Deering Supp. 1989).
185. See Midler, 849 F.2d at 463 (construing California law); Accord Factors Etc., 579
F.2d at 221 (construing New York law); Estate of Presley v. Russen, 513 F. Supp. 1339,
1354-55 (D.N.J. 1981) (construing New Jersey law).
186. Laisne v. California State Bd. of Optometry, 19 Cal. 2d 831, 835, 123 P.2d 457
(1942).
187. Gonsalves v. Hodgson, 38 Cal. 2d 91, 98-99, 237 P.2d 656 (1951).
188. A "license" gives permission; without such authority, the act in question would be
illegal. H. BLACK, BLACK'S LAW DICmTONARY 1067 (4th ed. rev'd 1968). A "transfer," on
the other hand, refers to "an act.. .by which the title to property is conveyed from one living
person to another." CAL. CIV. CODE § 1039 (Deering 1971).
189. CAL. CiV. CODE § 654 (1971). See also Desny v. Wilder, 46 Cal. 2d 715, 299 P.2d
257 (1956).
190. See Lugosi, 25 Cal. 3d at 819, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 326, quoting Prosser, Torts, supra
note 135, at 807; Eastwood, 149 Cal. App. 3d at 419, 198 Cal, Rptr. at 348.
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own tissue implies the right to sue for damages or injunctive relief if
one's tissue is used without permission. The Lugosi court recog-
nized this right in connection with the right of publicity.' 9' Simi-
larly, the full panoply of common law remedies should be available,
including lost profits as an element of damages,192 when the unau-
thorized use of human tissue is involved. To be sure, any relief
would be subject to the usual rules of proof and would raise new
issues unique to the biotechnology industry, but such issues can be
met on a case by case basis.' 93
Thirdly, subject to the requirements of informed consent, the
right to consent to the commercial use of one's own body tissue
should be freely transferable during one's lifetime. Under Califor-
nia law, property of any kind may be transferred,194 including such
intangibles as a contract right'9  and a cause of action. 196  The
191. See Lugosi, 25 Cal. 3d at 819, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 326; Eastwood, 149 Cal. App. 3d at
419, 198 Cal. Rptr. at 348. See also Bi-rite v. Button Master, 578 F. Supp. 59 (S.D.N.Y.
1983) (calculating damages caused by infringement of right of publicity).
192. See generally CAL. CIV. CODE § 3333 (Deering 1984); Natural Soda Prod. Co. v.
City of Los Angeles, 23 Cal. 2d 193, 199-200, 143 P.2d 12 (1943), cert. denied, 321 U.S. 793,
reh'g denied, 322 U.S. 768 (1944) (damage award in tort action may include lost profits pro-
vided "there is a satisfactory basis for estimating what the probable earnings would have been
had there been no tort.").
193. If the state legislature ever elects to regulate the commercial use of human tissue,
several statutes provide a common point of reference with respect to a remedial scheme.
Under California law, the statutory remedies available upon a violation of the statutory right
of privacy or statutory right of publicity include the following: statutory damages of $750 or
actual damages caused by the unauthorized use, whichever is greater, "any profits from the
unauthorized use that are attributable to the use and are not taken into account in computing
the actual damages," and punitive damages; the prevailing party also may recover attorneys
fees and costs. CAL. CIv. CODE §§ 3344(a), 990(a) (Deering Supp. 1989).
Similarly, under federal law, the remedies available for copyright infringement include:
either statutory damages of specified amounts, 17 U.S.C.A. § 504(c) (West 1977), or actual
damages caused by the infringement and any profits "that are attributable to the infringement
and are not taken into account in computing the actual damages." Id. at § 504(b). Further,
the statutory scheme provides for injunctive relief, the impoundment and destruction of in-
fringing copies, an award of costs to any party, and an award of attorneys fees to the prevail-
ing party. Id. at §§ 502, 503, 505. See Bi-rite, 578 F. Supp. at 60, 62 for an example of a case
where the court turned to the damages provisions of the Copyright Act for guidance in calcu-
lating the damages caused by the infringement of the right of publicity.
Both the state and federal statutes alter the traditional rules of proving lost profits. In
the former instance, the plaintiff only bears the burden of proving the gross revenue attributa-
ble to the use and the defendant must prove his or her deductible expenses. CAL. eV. CODE
§§ 3344(a), 990(a) (Deering Supp. 1989). In the latter instance, the statutory scheme is even
more plaintiff-oriented; the plaintiff need only prove "the infringer's gross revenue, and the
infringer is required to prove his or her deductible expenses and the elements of profit attribu-
table to factors other than the copyrighted work." 17 U.S.C.A. § 504(b) (West 1977).
Hence, in the present context a model exists for aggressive legislative action.
194. CAL. CIv. CODE § 1044 (Deering 1971).
195. Id. at § 1458.
196. Id. at § 954.
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analogous right of publicity may be transferred in California as well
as in other jurisdictions.197 Similar federal rights, like copyright,
may be transferred.' 98 Hence, as indicated above, only one limit
seems mandatory in the present context: Any transfer of any com-
mercial right in one's tissue must be contingent on one's informed
consent to the initial removal of body tissue. As a matter of public
policy, the right of informed consent should never be diminished or
relinquished because of any transfer of any commercial interest.
Finally, the question of descendibility seems best approached
by way of example. If John Moore should die without having li-
censed or transferred the right to use his tissue for a commercial
purpose, should the right to control and profit from the commercial
use of his tissue descend to his heirs or other named beneficiaries?
Or, if the unique value of John Moore's cell line had been discov-
ered after his death, should his heirs or beneficiaries inherit the
right to license the commercial use of the cell line? Arguably, these
questions should be answered in the affirmative.
Once again, right of publicity law is informative. In Lugosi,
the California Supreme Court held that the right of publicity was
personal to the individual and had to be exercised, if at all, during
the individual's lifetime. 99 The court thus declined to hold that the
right was descendible, but invited the state legislature to intervene
on behalf of interested heirs.2"° Accepting this invitation in 1984,
the California legislature enacted Civil Code § 990, a comprehen-
sive statute which created a statutory right of publicity and estab-
lished that the right was a descendible property interest.20' Among
other things, the statute specified the heirs to whom the right would
pass, the heirs' respective percentage interest in the right, and the
length of time for which the right would survive (50 years from the
death of the deceased personality).20 2
197. See Lugosi, 25 Cal. 3d at 823, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 329; CAL. CIV. CODE § 990(b)
(Deering Supp. 1989); accord, Factors Etc., 579 F.2d at 221-22; Haelan Laboratories, 202
F.2d at 868; Bi-rite, 555 F. Supp. at 1199-1200.
198. 17 U.S.C.A. § 201(d) (West's 1977). A federal copyright and the right of privacy
urged here are similar in at least several ways. First, both rights are intangible. Second,
copyright law protects "original works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expres-
sion," id. at § 102 (a), such as literary, musical, ind pictorial works. See id. These intellec-
tual products are at least analagous to the body prodicts in issue when human tissue is used
commercially. Finally, copyright protection and the privacy protection urged here both en-
courage individuals to contribute to the public good. See supra, notes 152-154 and accompa-
nying text.
199. Lugosi, 25 Cal. 3d at 823-24, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 329.
200. Id. at 822, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 328.
201. See Cal. Civ. Code § 990(a),(b) (Deering Supp. 1989).
202. Id. at § 990(d),(g) (Deering Supp. 1989).
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In jurisdictions outside of California, a number of courts ad-
dressing the issue have held that the right of publicity is descendi-
ble.20 3 As the courts have explained: If the right of publicity is
descendible, the right's commercial value will be preserved and the
rewards of individual effort will be greater; there is no reason why
those who would exploit a person's attributes should receive a wind-
fall at the expense of the individual's heirs or chosen beneficiaries;
other intangible property rights descend at death;2° and the law
favors survivability.2 °0
The same reasoning applies when the right involved pertains to
the commercial use of human tissue. The policy reasons favoring a
right to consent to the commercial use of human tissue will be en-
hanced if the right is descendible. If a person's death is to create a
windfall, it does not seem fair to subordinate the interests of heirs or
chosen beneficiaries to the interests of a researcher, university, or
commercial company. Further, descendibility would conform to
the favored policy of the law. Thus, whether courts proceed on a
case by case basis or the state legislature intervenes, there is good
reason to allow the right to consent to the commercial use of human
tissue to descend to an individual's heirs or successors-in-interest.
20 6
4. Arguments Against Protection of the Right To
Consent to the Commercial Use of One's Body
Tissue
a The Waste Argument: Tissue Without Value
In Moore, the dissenting appellate justice concluded that body
tissue should not be recognized as personal property, and opined:
"In any event, I am not prepared to extend the constitutionally
sanctified right of property.., to the refuse found on the floor of
the barbershop or nail salon, in the hospital bedpan, or in the oper-
ating room receptacle."20 7 With this rather dramatic statement, the
dissenting opinion summarized one argument made against the rec-
ognition of a property interest in human tissue: Once removed from
the body, human tissue becomes waste. The individual from whom
203. See American Heritage Products, 694 F.2d at 680-82; Factors Etc., 579 F.2d at 221-
22; Estate of Presley v. Russen, 513 F. Supp. at 1355; but see Memphis Dev. Found. v.
Factors Etc., Inc., 616 F.2d 956 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 953 (1980).
204. See, eg., 17 U.S.C.A. § 201(d) (West's 1977) (federal copyright); CAL. CIV. CODE
§ 954 (Deering 1971) (cause of action).
205. See American Heritage Products, 694 F.2d at 682; Presley, 513 F. Supp. at 1355.
206. Accord Note, Toward the Right of Commerciality, supra note 161, at 261.
207. Moore, 249 Cal. Rptr. at 535 (citations omitted) (George, A.J., dissenting).
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the tissue was removed, no longer has any interest in it.20 8 By anal-
ogy, this argument also could be leveled against a privacy interest in
human tissue: If tissue is waste and has no value to the individual
when removed, then the individual would have no interest in the
tissue's commercial use.
The waste argument, however, is self-serving and "fraught
with irony."209 It would deny John Moore any right to share in the
profits derived from his cell line on the theory that his own tissue,
once removed, was tantamount to "refuse... in the operating room
receptacle." On the other hand, the same argument would allow
Dr. Golde, Ms. Quan, the University, Genetics, and Sandoz to
claim the tissue, exploit it, and enjoy the profits of a product line
estimated at more than $3 billion by 1990. The irony is obvious.
One man's waste is another's treasure.21 °
In American jurisprudence, "the inviolability of the person is
sacred. '211 The inviolable, however, would be violated if body tis-
sue were treated as meaningless waste once removed from the body.
A sense of the whole would be lost. Even when removed, tissue is
linked to a particular body and bears forever the genetic stamp of a
unique individual. Hence, the waste argument seems to err by ig-
noring the necessary connection between an individual and a partic-
ular body part.212 Certainly, the connection may change when a
particular body tissue is removed; the tissue may be used for diag-
208. For examples of arguments based on the assumption that removed tissue is waste,
see Wagner, supra note 161, at 244 (when tissue is removed for therapeutic purpose, "the
patient probably intends to abandon the tissue considering it to be repugnant material");
Caplan, supra note 130, at 450 ("in the area of commercial biotechnology... the biological
materials involved are almost always replenishable and often constitute waste materials, at
least from the point of view of the donor").
209. Moore, 249 Cal. Rptr. at 507.
210. See also Danforth, supra note 130, at 190 (arguing that such a result "offends tradi-
tional mores" and "tends to treat the human body as a commodity-a means to a profitable
end").
211. Union Pac. Ry. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 252 (1891).
212. See Murray, supra note 161, at 2-3 (arguing that human organs and tissues, even
when removed from the body, should be treated with appropriate respect and dignity).
Human experience also belies the notion that tissue is devalued when removed from the
body. Consider an example from everyday life. When a child of five or six years has lost a so-
called baby tooth, the tooth does not lose its value. To the contrary, it acquires an almost
magical value, and even a commercial value. According to popular custom, the tooth is put
under the child's pillow at night and the tooth fairy substitutes a quarter (or whatever
amount the market. deinands) for the lost tooth while the child is asleep.
The beliefs and customs of many cultures also attest to the power and significance of
body parts, even when separated from the whole body. In many "pre-modern" cultures, the
flesh of a man or animal may be eaten or incorporated into a symbolic ritual so the partici-
pants will acquire the physical or spiritual qualities of that man or animal, or the particular
characteristics believed to reside in a particular body part. See J. FRAZER, THE GOLDEN
246 COMPUTER & HIGH TECHNOLOGYLAWJOURNAL [Vol. 5
nosis, garden-variety research, or commercial exploitation, or
merely may be disposed of in the usual way.2 13 Nevertheless, re-
gardless of its ultimate disposition, the fundamental link between a
body part and the whole body must be remembered and respected.
b. The Gift Argument: Value Beyond Price
Laws governing the acquisition of human organs for transplan-
tation have been used to support a property interest in human tis-
sue."14 Conversely, the same laws have been used to argue against a
property interest.215 Quite simply, the latter argument relies on the
fact that sales of organs for transplantation are restricted by federal
and state law. The National Organ Transplant Act216 broadly pro-
hibits any "transfer [of] any human organ for valuable considera-
tion for use in human transplantation if the transfer affects
interstate commerce."21 7  The Uniform Anatomical Gift Act 218 is
built on the premise that cadaver organs can be donated as a gift but
not sold. 2 19 Also, California law specifically bans the commercial
brokerage of organs for purpose of transplantation. 220  Therefore,
the gift argument concludes by analogy that the sale of tissue for
commercial exploitation should be banned.
BOUGH at 572-78 (abr. 1963). For example, a human heart may be eaten so one may acquire
the valor of an especially courageous individual. Id. at 576-77.
The link between a part of the body and the whole being is also evident in Native Ameri-
can culture where the spirit of a hunted animal was greatly respected and certain taboos
governed the disposal of the animal remains. If these taboos were violated, that is, if particu-
lar remains were not disposed of according to custom, the animal's spirit would be violated
and the human population would suffer as a result. Martin, The European Impact on the
Culture of a Northeastern Algonquian Tribe" An Ecological Interpretation, 31 WM. & MARY
Q. 3, 12-16 (Jan. 1974).
213. See Moore, 249 Cal. Rptr. at 510; CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 7054.4 (Deer-
ing 1975) (generally providing for internment or incineration of body parts after scientific
use); Murray, supra note 161, at 2.
214. See, eg., Moore, 249 Cal. Rptr. at 506; Note, Toward the Right of Commerciality,
supra note 161, at 216-18.
215. See, eg., Moore, 249 Cal. Rptr. at 538-39 (George, A.J. dissenting); Wagner, supra
note 161, at 340-41; Murray, supra note 161, at 3.
216. Pub. L. No. 98-507, 98 Stat. 2339 (1984).
217. 42 U.S.C. § 275e(a) (West Supp. 1988).
218. See CAL. HEALTH AND SAFETY CODE §§ 7150-7156.5 (Deering Supp. 1989).
219. See id. at §§ 7150.1(a), 7155.
220. CAL. PENAL CODE § 367f(a) (Deering 1985). This section makes it "unlawful for
any person to knowingly acquire, receive, sell, promote the transfer of, or otherwise transfer
any human organ, for purposes of transplantation, for valuable consideration." Section
367f(e), however, specifically provides the statutory ban "shall not apply to the person from
whom the organ is removed, nor to the person who receives the transplant, or those persons'
next-of.kin who assisted in obtaining the organ .... In effect, therefore, section 367f only
prohibits the brokerage of human organs; it does not prohibit the purchase and sale of organs
directly between a living donor and recipient.
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The gift argument also could be made against the recognition
of a property interest in the right to consent to the commercial use
of one's own tissue. The argument, however, is flawed in at least
two ways. First, the gift argument is subject to the same irony as
the waste argument: The argument is used to defeat the individual's
right to profit from the commercial value of his or her own tissue,
but not to defeat the commercial interest of the involved physician,
investigator, university, or biotechnology companies. Thus, in
Moore, the Court of Appeal argued as follows for the patient's right
to profit:
It has been suggested by writers that biotechnology is no longer a
purely research oriented field in which the primary incentives are
academic or for the betterment of humanity. Biological materi-
als no longer pass freely to all scientists. As here, the rush to
patent for exclusive use is rampant. The links being established
between academics and industry to profitize biological specimens
are a subject of great concern. If this science has become science
for profit, then we fail to see any justiflcation for excluding the
patient from participation in those profits.22'
Secondly, when applied to the commercial exploitation of an
individual cell line, the gift argument cannot be justified by the
same policy concerns which support the argument in the context of
organ transplantation. To begin with, any organ donated for trans-
plantation is used by only one patient, and donors and donees are
matched through a rigorous selection process. In all cases, the do-
nor and donee are compared with respect to one or more physical
attributes, including blood type, tissue type, and relative organ
size.222 Also, as a logistical matter, the donor organ and donee
must be brought together while the donor organ can be
preserved.223
Additional social, psychological, and physical factors are con-
sidered in selecting the donee. For example, the donee must have
the resources to pay for the transplant procedure. 224 The donee
must be able to deal with the lifelong implications of an organ trans-
plant such as the lifelong regimen of medication necessary to sup-
221. Moore, 249 Cal. Rptr. at 509 (emphasis added).
222. See Starzl, Hakala, Tzakis, Gordon, Stieber, Makowka, Klimoski, Bahnson, A Mul-
tifactorial System for Equitable Selection of Cadaver Kidney Recipients, 257 J. AMER. MED.
Assoc. 3073 (June 12, 1987) [hereinafter Starzl, et. all.
223. Id. at 3075.
224. See W. WINSLADE & J. Ross, CHOOSING LIFE OR DEATH: A GUIDE FOR PA-
TIENTS, FAMILIES, AND PROFESSIONALS 178-79, 180, 195, 200-201 (1986) [hereinafter Win-
slade & Ross].
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press the donee's own immune reaction to the organ.225 Finally,
other factors may be determinative, such as the donee's age, the
severity of the donee's illness, and the length of time the donee's
name has been on a waiting list.226
Likewise, if the donor is a living person rather than a cadaver,
the donor is evaluated carefully. Although the donor always retains
the right to consent to the procedure,227 many physicians will not
ask an individual to donate if they believe the procedure would be
detrimental to the individual's overall physical and emotional well-
being.22
8
Hence, in the context of transplant surgery, it seems appropri-
ate to conceive of organ donation as a "gift of life" which embodies
some kind of deep bond among individuals, a relationship which
cannot and should not be translated into economic terms. 229 Fur-
ther, the statutory ban on organ sales reflects a deliberate policy
choice designed to prevent exploitation. With respect to organ re-
cipients, organs are a scarce resource; allowing organ sales would
promote bidding wars among patients; and the image of very ill,
perhaps desperate patients competing in the marketplace is unset-
tling at best.230 Moreover, the distribution of scarce life-saving re-
sources, based solely on ability to pay the highest sum the market
will bear, offends many common notions of justice.23'
Exploitation of the donor is of equal concern. Legislators have
been loathe to endorse a marketplace where one may give up for
profit an eye, kidney, lung, or even a liver or heart.232 To be sure,
the statutory ban against organ sales may be criticized as a paternal-
istic restriction of individual liberty. 2 3 Nevertheless, it reflects the
reasonable concern that a market in body parts will result in the
exploitation of the poor for the benefit of the wealthy.23
4
The concerns raised by the commercial exploitation of a
225. See id. at 180-81, 198-99.
226. See id. at 190, 196; Starzl, et. al, supra note 222.
227. See generally supra notes 74-90 and accompanying text.
228. See winslade & Ross, supra note 224, at 192, 202-03.
229. See generally, Murray, supra note 161, at 3; T. Murray, Gifts of the Body and the
Needs of Strangers, 17 HASTINGS CR. RFP. 30, 35-36 (Apr. 1987).
230. See, ag., Caplan, supra note 130, at 448-49; Andrews, supra note 161, at 34.
231. See, eg., Caplan, supra note 130, at 449; see generally Childress, Who Shall Live
When Not All Can Live?, 53 SoUNDINGs 339-55 (Winter 1970) (arguing for selection of organ
recipients based initially on medical acceptability and then by random selection).
232. See Caplan, supra note 130, at 449-50 (risk associated with donation of kidney or
bone marrow sufficient to justify ban on purchase or sale).
233. See eg., Andrews, supra note 161, at 32-34.
234. See, e-g., id. at 31-32; Winslade & Ross, supra note 224, at 194-95.
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human cell line are very different. The tissue or cells from which a
cell line is established, are not used by only one other person within
the context of a unique, even moral relationship. Instead, the tissue
or cells are used to develop a cell line and related product line
which, in turn, can be developed further to create commercial prod-
ucts, worth large sums of money, which then may help large num-
bers of individuals. In other words, while the purpose of an organ
transplant is medical and therapeutic, the purpose of developing a
cell line is scientific and commercial.
Further, the right to profit from the commercial use of one's
own tissue does not seem to involve the same risks of exploitation as
the purchase and sale of organs for transplantation. There is no
comparable bidder. The research and development team is inter-
ested in fame and fortune, and is not in the same vulnerable position
as a desperately ill patient hoping for a chance of recovery. More-
over, the donor is not subject to the same kind of pressures or detri-
ment as a needy donor willing to barter an eye or kidney. For
example, John Moore's spleen was removed for therapeutic pur-
poses, and the other tissue removed was regenerative (blood, blood
serum, skin, bone marrow aspirate, and sperm). In this respect,
John Moore's situation was not unique, for tissues and cells (not
organs) are most commonly used in biotechnology research.235 Fi-
nally, if John Moore's commercial rights in his own tissue had been
recognized, Mr. Moore would have been in a very different bargain-
ing position than the financially desperate donor imagined in the
transplant setting.
Hence, although the gift argument is well placed in the context
of human organ transplants, it only seems to obscure the real inter-
ests at stake when the commercial development of human tissue is
involved.23 6
c. The Impediment to Research Argument:
Unlikely Forecast of Doom
In Moore, the University argued that medical research would
be stifled if a property interest were recognized in human tissue.237
Illustrating the argument with the example of a research study us-
ing material from hundreds of different pituitary glands, the Uni-
235. Ownership of Human Tisues, supra note 5, at 3-4.
236. Likewise, notwithstanding the ban on organ sales, other biological products, such as
blood products and sperm, may be purchased and sold. See Note, Toward the Right of Com-
merciality, supra note 161, at 219-21; Caplan, supra note 130, at 449.
237. See Moore, 249 Cal. Rptr. at 508-09.
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versity argued that it would be onerous to track ownership of
individual pituitary tissue in that kind of situation.238 The Court of
Appeal rejected the argument for several reasons: The University
had not cited any evidence to support the argument, and there was
no practical reason to believe that research would suffer if either the
patient's consent or additional record keeping were required.239
The patient, not the researcher, had the right to decide what could
be done with his or her tissue, and there was no reason why the
patient should not share in any profits.24° Finally, although the
University predicted that the court's decision would have many dire
consequences, these concerns were speculative at best and could be
addressed by legislation if necessary.241
If a privacy right to consent to the commercial use of one's
own tissue is analyzed as a property right, the same practical objec-
tions-and same rebuttal-could be made. Furthermore, any kind
of slippery slope argument must consider that Moore is distin-
guished by several facts: (1) John Moore's tissue was unique, per-
haps one of a kind; (2) only John Moore's tissue was used to
establish the Mo line; and (3) there seems to be a direct link be-
tween the Mo line and commercial products. 242 In combination,
these factors invested John Moore's property rights with immense
commercial value. Arguably, if any one factor were missing, that
value would be reduced; if all factors were missing, the value could
be negligible.243 Hence, in the pituitary example, it is arguable that
any individual property rights had little or no commercial worth.
The research did not seem to hinge on any unique qualities of any
particular pituitary; many pituitaries were used; and the research
did not appear directly related to the development of any particular
commercial product.
Thus, if the individual's right to consent to the commercial use
of his or her own tissue is recognized as a property right, not every-
one's right automatically will be invested with great commercial
value. Stated differently, although everyone may have a right to
238. See id. at 508-09 n.14.
239. See id. at 508-09 n.14, 509.
240. Id. at 509.
241. Id.
242. By analogy, in order to recover for the wrongful use of an attribute of identity under
CAL. CIV. CODE § 3344 (Deering Supp. 1989), there must be "[a] 'direct' connec-
tion.. .between the use and the commercial purpose." Eastwood, 149 Cal. App. 3d at 417-18,
198 Cal. Rptr. at 347 (citing Johnson v. Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich, Inc., 43 Cal. App. 3d
880, 895, 118 Cal. Rptr. 370, 381 (1974)).
243. For an interesting discussion of a licensing system based on a fixed, statutory rate of
compensation, see Danforth, supra note 130, at 199-201.
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consent to (or license) the commercial use of his or her own tissue
and everyone may be entitled to the disclosure of material informa-
tion during the informed consent process, not everyone will have a
property right of any significant worth. Indeed, it seems likely that
John Moore's claim to compensation will be the exception rather
than the rule.2'
III. Moore Revisited: Crossroad To Another Era
New technologies test the vitality of legal concepts, and Moore
measures the vitality of a number of legal doctrines, including in-
formed consent, privacy, and basic property notions. Arguably,
these doctrines are in fact vital and able to provide an appropriate
framework within which to define and evaluate the competing inter-
ests in Moore.
On a policy level, the legal issues raised by Moore also chal-
lenge our assumptions regarding the role of technology in human
life. In recent years, the impact of technology has become a major
concern on many legal frontiers. For example, the National Envi-
ronmental Policy Act of 1969245 (NEPA) reflects Congress' sweep-
ing conclusion that "new and expanding technological advances"
have a "profound impact...on.... the natural environment,, 246 but
that technology's impact is ill understood and poorly controlled.247
Hence, NEPA is designed to enhance the federal government's abil-
ity to understand and control the environmental effects of new
technology.248
When computers are involved, technology has inspired a more
optimistic response. Oftentimes, society is confounded by com-
puters, 249 but a Congressional commission which studied the inter-
face between computer technology and copyright law, rendered this
enthusiastic statement:
From the Renaissance through the Industrial Revolution to
244. See generally Ownership of Human Tissues, supra note 5, at 55-56 (analyzing the
role of common, uncommon, and rare tissues in research and product development; observ-
ing that most developments depend on common tissues removed from many individuals; and
observing that rare tissues do not necessarily have any commercial value).
245. 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 4321-4347 (West 1977).
246. Id. at § 4331(a).
247. Foundation on Economic Trends v. Heckler, 756 F.2d 143, 147 (D.C. Cir. 1985)
(citing legislative history).
248. Id.
249. See, eg., Bhattal v. Grand Hyatt-New York, 563 F. Supp. 277, 278 (S.D.N.Y.
1983) ("All things in the modern world which go wrong for reasons other than the applica-
tion of Murphy's Law, seem to go wrong because of a particular sort of mechanical malevo-
lence known as 'computer error.' ").
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the present, technological developments have consistently ex-
tended society's power to control natural phenomena and to
shape its own destiny. The rapid developments in communica-
tions and information technology of the past three decades have
immeasurably expanded and extended the power of human
communication.
One of the most important contributions to the communica-
tion and information revolution has been the digital computer.
Animated by elements of human creative genius, these machines
are opening new avenues for recording, storing, and transmitting
human thought. New means of communication transcend words
fixed on paper or images on film and permit authors to communi-
cate creatively, adaptively, and dynamically with their
audience.
2 50
Based on the Commission's report, Congress extended copyright
protection to computer programs.25 1
The use of high technology remains more controversial in med-
ical decision making. Although a number of courts already have
considered the effects of mechanical. life support and established the
patient's right to refuse life-prolonging treatment,252 many agoniz-
ing dilemmas remain. When the patient is a very premature or se-
verely handicapped newborn, federal law seeks to encourage
aggressive treatment; but the wisdom of life-prolonging treatment
has been questioned when the infant remains critically ill with a low
chance of survival or profound cognitive problems.2 3 New repro-
250. Natl Comm'n on New Technological Uses of Copyrighted Works, Final Report 9
(1979). See also J. SCULLEY, ODYSSEY PEPSI TO APPLE... A JOURNEY OF ADVENTURE,
IDEAS, AND THE FUTURE 150-53, 360-65, 403-16 (1987) (impact of personal computers on
learning and innovation in America conceived in visionary terms).
251. Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240, 1247-48 (3d
Cir. 1983), cert. dismissed, 464 U.S. 1033 (1984).
252. See supra notes 91-99 and accompanying text. As one California court queried:
"The question presented by this modern technology is, once undertaken, at what point does it
cease to perform its intended function and who should have the authority to decide that any
further prolongation of the dying process is of no benefit to either the patient or his family?"
Barber v. Superior Court, 147 Cal. App. 3d 1006, 1017, 195 Cal. Rptr. 484, 490-91 (1983).
253. Compare 42 U.S.C.A. § 5106(a)(b)(10) (West Supp. 1989) (1984 amendments to
Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act) (in order to receive federal funds, states re-
quired to respond to reports of "withholding medically indicated treatment" which, as de-
fined by § 5106(g)(10),.
means the failure to respond to the infant's life-threatening conditions by pro-
viding treatment ... which... will be most likely to be effective in ameliorat-
ing or correcting all such conditions, except. . .when. . .(A) the infant is
chronically and irreversibly comatose; (B) the provision of such treatment
would (i) merely prolong dying; (ii) not be effective in ameliorating or cor-
recting all of the infant's life-threatening conditions; or (iii) otherwise be futile
in terms of the survival of the infant; or (C) the provision of such treatment
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ductive technologies also involve complex concerns. Commercial
surrogacy, for example, implicates our basic notions of what is best
for children, what it means to be a parent, and what legitimate
norms society may enforce.254 Likewise, the public funding of med-
ical procedures may demand a cruel choice of priorities; public
funds, for example, must be allocated between relatively high cost,
high technology procedures serving relatively few individuals (such
as organ transplants) or more basic public health programs serving
many individuals (such as prenatal care).255
Hence, the policy issues raised by Moore can be viewed within
a broader context of technological concerns. Sometimes pessimis-
tic, sometimes optimistic, and sometimes controversial, our views of
technology still reflect a basic policy effort to control our environ-
ment or to control technology. This singular focus has shaped the
terms of our policy debates, but need not be taken for granted. The
pattern of our thoughts and perceptions is woven through history,
and arguably our assumptions regarding technology have been
shaped by the rise of modern science beginning with the Scientific
Revolution of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.256 To de-
velop this point further, a brief journey in time is necessary.
The Scientific Revolution was built on the work of men such as
Nicolaus Copernicus (1473-1543), Johannes Kepler (1571-1630),
Galileo Galilei (1564-1642), Francis Bacon (1561-1626), and Ren6
Descartes (1596-1650). Culminating with the brilliant work of Sir
Isaac Newton (1642-1727), the achievements of this period include
the formation of the modern scientific method and the mechanical
laws of physics. 25 7
would be virtually futile in terms of the stm 'ival of the infant and the treatment
itself under such circumstances would be inhumane.
with Kopelman, Ivans, Kopelman, Neonatologists Judge the "Baby Doe" Regulations, 318
NEw ENG. J. MED. 677 (Mar. 17, 1988) (survey showing that significant number of physi-
cians believe that such regulations do not allow for adequate consideration of an infant's
suffering and sometimes either encourage or require over-treatment when comfort, rather
than maximum prolongation of life, may be in the infant's best interest).
254. See, eg., In re Baby M, 109 N.J. 396, 537 A.2d 1227 (1988) (holding that commer-
cial surrogacy contract conflicts with New Jersey law and public policy and therefore is ille-
gal and invalid).
255. See, eg., Durbin, Bone Marrow Transplantation: Economic, Ethical, and Social Is-
sues, 82 PEDIATRICS 774 (Nov. 1988); Jennings, A Grassroots Movement in Bioethics, 18 HAs-
TINGS CTR. *RP. (Special Supp. June/July 1988).
256. See generally C. MERCHANT, THE DEATH OF NATURE WOMEN, ECOLOGY, AND
THE SCIENTIFC REVOLUTION (1980) (rich, historical account of the Scientific Revolution
and its impact on Western culture) [hereinafter Merchant]; F. CAPRA, THE TURNING POINT
SCIENCE, SOCIETY, AND THE RISING CULTURE (1982) (provocative work, authored by a
physicist, analyzing the impact and limits of a mechanistic world view) [hereinafter Capra].
257. See generally, Capra, supra note 256, at 54-66.
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With respect to scientific method, Bacon is acknowledged as
the father of the inductive method, that is, an empirical form of
investigation based on experiments designed to yield general conclu-
sions which then can be tested by further experiments. 258
Descartes, on the other hand, developed the deductive method,
whereby a problem is reduced to its component parts and the parts
are studied in logical order.25 9 Newton combined the two, (empiri-
cal induction and rational deduction), showing that experimental,
empirical evidence and systematic, rational interpretation were
complementary and each essential to reliable theory. 6
Turning to the physical explanation of the world, the Scientific
Revolution marked the end of a geocentric cosmology. Centering on
the earth, this view of reality had endured for more than a thousand
years, but the work of Copernicus, Kepler, and Galileo firmly estab-
lished a heliocentric view of the heavens.261 At the same time, the
Scientific Revolution tolled the end of an organic world view
through which nature was understood to be a living organism and
the earth was conceived as a nurturing, beneficent mother.262 Yield-
ing to the achievements of men such as Descartes and Newton, the
modem world view became more mechanistic. 263
Descartes was driven by a vision that mathematics was the key
to certainty and truth.2 " With his discovery of analytic geometry,
Descartes was able to express curves in algebraic equations and use
mathematics to analyze moving bodies.265 Newton went even fur-
ther, creating an entirely new form of mathematics (now called dif-
ferential calculus) through which he was able to synthesize the
empirical laws of planetary motion (which Kepler had derived from
astronomical tables) and the laws of falling bodies (which Galileo
had discovered).266 Newton thus formulated universal laws to de-
scribe the motion of all objects, whether located on the earth or in
the heavens, subject to the force of gravity.267
As physical phenomena were thus defined by abstract laws, the
world lost its living, animate quality. In Cartesian philosophy,
mind and matter were torn asunder, with mind considered more
258. See Merchant, supra note 256, at 164-86; Capra, supra note 256, at 55-56.
259. See Capra, supra note 256, at 59.
260. See id. at 64.
261. See id. at 54.
262. See Merchant, supra note 256, at 1-28.
263. See Merchant, supra note 256, at 192-215, 216-35, 275-89.
264. See Capra, supra note 256, at 57; Merchant, supra note 256, at 203-204.
265. See Capra, supra note 256, at 58.
266. See Capra, supra note 256, at 63; Merchant, supra note 256, at 275.
267. See Capra, supra note 256, at 63-64, 65-66; Merchant, supra note 256, at 276-79.
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certain and superior: "Cogito, ergo sum"; "I think, therefore I
am. '26 8 Similarly, in Newtonian physics, matter became passive,
formed of "solid, massy, hard, impenetrable moveable particles, '269
while motion and force (including gravity) became external to
matter.270
Through this mechanistic world view, man could achieve a
new kind of power and control over nature. As Descartes stated,
men could now become "the masters and possessors of nature." 271
In more sexual imagery, Bacon imagined the subjugation of nature
so that nature might give up her secrets for human use.272 With
human intervention, nature could be "put in constraint,1271 and
"forced out of her natural state and squeezed and molded."'274 In
that way, nature could be "made as it were new, 21 75 and "human
knowledge and human power [would] meet as one." 276
The Scientific Revolution continues to shape our world.
Newton's laws define our understanding of many events including
the motion of planets, moons, and comets, and the flow of tides.2 77
Even more generally, the scientific method remains the cornerstone
of scientific truth, and mechanistic assumptions continue to define
our understanding of reality in terms of mind and matter, subject
and object, cause and effect. Moreover, the drive to pry loose the
secrets of nature and to use those secrets to give man ever greater
control of nature, is everywhere apparent. In public discourse, we
alternatively wrestle with the problems of controlling technology
and rejoice in the human power enhanced by technology. Further,
our daily lives are more and more intertwined with technology-in
the research laboratory and hospital, in the factory, home, and of-
fice, in the means of transportation and communication-and tech-
nology attests to the powerful drive unleashed by the Scientific
268. See Capra, supra note 256, at 59-60.
269. See Merchant, supra note 256, at 278 (quoting NEWTON, OPncKs 400 (4th ed.
1730)).
270. See id at 277-79.
271. See id. at 188 (quoting R. DESCARTES, DiscouRSE ON METHOD (Part 4), 1 PHILO-
SOPHICAL WORKS OF DESCARTES 119 (E. Haldane & G. Ross eds. 1955)).
272. See id. at 168-72.
273. Id. at 170 (quoting F. BACON, De Augmentis in 4 WORKS 294 (J. Spedding, R. Ellis,
& D. Heath eds. 1870)).
274. Id. at 171 (quoting F. BACON, The Great Instauration in 4 WORKS 29 (J. Spedding,
R. Ellis & D. Heath eds. 1870).
275. Id. at 170 (quoting F. BACON, De Augmentis in 4 WORKS 294 (J. Spedding, R. Ellis
& D. Heath eds. 1870)).
276. Id. at 171 (quoting F. BACON, Novum Organum (Part 2), 4 WORKS 247 (J. Sped-
ding, R. Ellis & D. Heath eds. 1870)).
277. See Capra, supra note 256, at 66-68.
19891
COMPUTER & HIGH TECHNOLOGY L4WJOURNL
Revolution.278
Despite this powerful history, our technology debates can no
longer afford to be dominated by our simple focus on controlling
nature or controlling technology.279 The issues are too complex.
Again, consider Moore. In one sense, Moore reflects a classic ac-
complishment of Western science. John Moore's cell line was de-
veloped through scientific research based on the scientific method.
Moreover, the development of a cell line represents the natural pro-
gression of a reductionist method; as an object of study, the body
has been broken into smaller and smaller pieces until the inquiry
has focused on some of its smallest parts, namely, the cell and its
component genes. Finally, the ability to manipulate and reproduce
a cell line through genetic engineering reflects an awesome ability to
control - and alter - the basic characteristics of life. Such power,
however, generates questions science cannot answer. We may be
able to control the fundamental mechanisms of life, but to what end
should that power be used? To what end should that power be re-
strained? Who should make those decisions?2 80
The impasse framed by these questions may be unlocked if,
once again, we turn to physics as a reference point for physics has
progressed beyond the limits of Newtonian mechanics and revealed
a new vision of reality. In the twentieth century, phenomena occur-
ring at or near the speed of light were observed on a vast, galactic
scale and on a very small atomic and subatomic scale. These phe-
nomena could not be explained fully by Newton's laws. On the si-
dereal level, Newton's laws were displaced by the theory of
relativity conceived by Albert Einstein (1879-1955); on the particle
level, by the theories of quantum mechanics developed by Einstein
as well as Max Planck (1858-1947), Niels Bohr (1885-1962), Louis
de Broglie (1892-1987), Irwin Schr6dinger (1887-1961), Wolfgang
Pauli (1900-1958), Werner Heisenberg (1901-1976), and Paul Dirac
(1902-1984).281
278. See generally Merchant, supra note 256, at 192-215.
279. See generally Technology Assessment, supra note 17.
280. See generally Splicing Life, supra note 36, at 14-17, 53-60.
281. See generally Capra, supra note 256, at 70-72, 75-97. The limits of Newtonian
mechanics were evident even before these twentieth century developments occurred. In the
19th century, for example, Michael Faraday (1791-1867) and Clerk Maxwell (1831-1879)
discovered electromagnetism, a force existing independently of material bodies, which could
not be explained by Newton's laws of mechanics.
In biology, Charles Darwin (1809-1882) marshalled a vast amount of evidence and pro-
posed a theory of evolution based on random mutation and natural selection. His thesis
implied the idea of change over time as well as the development of simple forms into more
complex structures, and could not be explained mechanically.
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Very generally, the theory of relativity is based on the fact that
the speed of light is constant for all observers, no matter how fast
the observer is travelling.2" 2 The implications of this simple fact are
profound. Force and matter can no longer be considered as funda-
mentally different and independent. Instead, mass must be under-
stood as a form of energy, with the relationship described by
Einstein's famous equation, E = mc2, (where "E" is energy, "m" is
mass, and "c" is the speed of light).2" 3 Likewise, space and time
can no longer be considered absolute or independent of each other.
Instead, the universe must be conceived in four dimensions, as a
continuum of space-time which must be described in terms relative
to the observer and which not only affects the events occurring
within its matrix but also is affected by those events.2"4
The findings of quantum mechanics are equally remarkable. In
classical physics, a particle is defined by its position in space and its
velocity. If these characteristics are known accurately at any point
in time, the particle's position and velocity can be predicted at any
other time. However, when an observer attempts to determine the
position or velocity of a subatomic particle, the act of measurement
imparts energy to the particle which changes the characteristic that
is not being observed.28 5 Thus, a particle can never be defined in
absolute terms. Matter tends to exist and events tend to occur so
there is a statistical probability that particles will exist at given
points in space at given points in time. This "uncertainty principle"
is a cornerstone of quantum mechanics, and further illustrates that
immutable laws do not exist.28
6
Thus, the theory of relativity and quantum mechanics reveal
an organic,. dynamic world which only can be understood in terms
of the integral relationship between subject and object, the part and
the whole, matter and energy, space and time. Further, the world is
no longer explicable only in terms of immutable laws. Probabilities
or tendencies must be taken into account.
Literature often embodies abstract concepts and here, Frank-
enstein,2 8 an old, familiar tale, illustrates the limits of a mechanistic
world view as well as the need for a more expansive, organic view.
282. S. HAWKING, A BRIEF HISTORY OF TIME FROM THE BIG BANG TO BLACK HOLES
20 (1988) [hereinafter Hawking].
283. Id. at 20-21.
284. Id. at 21-33.
285. Id. at 54-55.
286. Id. at 55-56.
287. M. SHELLEY, FRANKENSTEIN OR THE MODERN PROMETHEUS (Oxford University
Press ed. 1985).
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The Frankenstein novel was written by Mary Shelley and first pub-
lished in 1818.288 As the story unfolds, young Victor Frankenstein
was enchanted by the secrets of nature. He mastered university sci-
ence, and still driven to "explore unknown powers, '289 sought to
create a human being. To this end, he collected body parts from
graves, assembled a man of giant stature, and infused him with life.
Frankenstein, however, was horrified and fled from his room and
laboratory.
The creature, left alone to venture into the world, gradually
learned of human society as well as the great fear and hatred he
inspired. Desperately alone, the creature searched for Frankenstein
and in the process met and killed Frankenstein's younger brother.
Frankenstein, more distraught than ever, encountered the creature
high in the mountains where the creature made an impassioned de-
mand: Frankenstein must create a female companion for him.
Frankenstein agreed and began the task, but could not finish. En-
raged and bereft of hope, the creature again sought vengeance, first
killing Frankenstein's boyhood friend and then Frankenstein's wife
of only a few hours. Frankenstein's father later died of grief. Vow-
ing to destroy the creature and to avenge the death of his loved
ones, Frankenstein pursued the creature into the Arctic where
Frankenstein died in the chase. The creature, too, was doomed.
Soon he would die, alone and repulsed by his own deeds, on a fu-
neral pyre of his own making. So the story ends.
On one level, Frankenstein is a study in paradox. Frankenstein
tried to create a beautiful human form, but the creature was un-
naturally hideous. Frankenstein expected to act as a father to the
creature, but never gave the creature a name. Frankenstein labored
passionately to create life, but thrice spumed the creature and left
him to survive alone. Frankenstein expected to be praised as a crea-
tor, but the creature became his accursed and mortal enemy.
Frankenstein gave life, but died with the effort to extinguish that
life.
On another level, Frankenstein is an allegory of the power and
pitfalls of mechanism. Frankenstein was enraptured by scientific in-
vestigation. He sought and achieved great power over nature, as-
suming that power could be controlled. The exercise of power,
however, had unexpected effects. From the moment Frankenstein
animated the creature, Frankenstein recoiled from the act of crea-
tion. From the moment the creature breathed with life, the creature
288. Id. at xv.
289. Id. at 48.
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acquired an independent human nature with independent human
needs. From the moment of creation, Frankenstein and the crea-
ture were locked in a tragic, solitary struggle.
Frankenstein never shared the secret of his creation with any-
one he loved, and gradually lost each of his loved ones. The crea-
ture, too, was alone-lacking the companionship of his creator,
society, or any kind of equal. As between creator and creature,
there was only enmity, pursuit, and death. The struggle, however,
was not the only alternative possible. Frankenstein could have
shared his fellowship with the creature, assuming the responsibility
of a creator, teacher, friend, or benefactor. He could have shared
his secret with others. By doing so, he may have averted many trag-
edies, but Frankenstein never seemed to perceive the option.
Thus, there is a lesson to Frankenstein. The quest for knowl-
edge need not be abandoned; technology need not be foresworn; in-
dividual freedom need not be ignored. Yet, the relationship among
individuals must be recognized; technology's human dimension
must be realized; and the responsibilities of power must be
accepted.
The organic perspective implied by post-Newtonian physics as
well as Frankenstein is emerging throughout society in many differ-
ent ways. The environmental movement of the nineteen sixties and
seventies has matured into a new study of ecology and a new eco-
logical ethic ("ecoethics"). Both focus on the relationships within
nature, including the role of the human population, and the dy-
namic unity of the whole.290 In a parallel development, the wo-
men's movement of the same period has matured into a creative
study of the feminine and masculine aspects of many disciplines. In
psychology,291 history,2 92 and even legal jurisprudence,293 the male
perspective has been identified with individuality and separation
among individuals, with abstract reasoning, with achievement,
power, and control; the newly recognized female experience, with
the unity of nature, with the connection between individuals, with
responsibility and the awareness of relative needs. Likewise, in soci-
290. See generally Merchant, supra note 256, at 293-94; B. DEVALL & G. SESSIONS,
DEEP ECOLOGY (1985); Plastic Trees, supra note 17 (criticizing an environmental policy
based on human wants and self-interest, and proposing an alternative ethic based on the
recognition "that humanity is a part of nature and the natural order a constituent part of
humanity.").
291. See generally C. GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY
AND WOMEN'S DEVELOPMENT (1982).
292. See generally Merchant, supra note 256.
293. See generally Scales, The Emergence of Feminist Jurisprudence: An Essay, 95 YALE
L. J. 1373.
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ology294 and ethical theory,295 the limits of individual autonomy
have been examined, and the need for greater community expressed.
Thus, within an organic world view, the terms of our technol-
ogy policies might be enlarged to include relationships and responsi-
bilities as well as power and control. More specifically, within an
organic world view, we may better recognize that technology is an
expression of our humanity and not merely a means to plumb and
harness the secrets of nature.296 We may better recognize the unity
of nature and that humankind is part of nature. We may better
recognize that individuals have dignity as whole persons and that
body and mind are inseparable. We may better recognize the con-
nections between individuals and the relationships through which
they exist. Further, we may better recognize the responsibilities
which both individuals and communities bear for each other and
the planet Earth.
Finally, within an organic world view, we may better define the
policy implications of Moore. Arguably, the legal analysis devel-
oped above will preserve the link between a part of Mr. Moore's
body, even when removed, and his right to decide how to use his
body. The persons developing Mr. Moore's cell line will be held to
the obligations of a partnership serving common human goals.2 9 7
Moreover, without any loss of human dignity, the technical poten-
tial of our human nature may be accepted and protected.
IV. CONCLUSION
Using the new tools of biotechnology, it has become possible
for scientific investigators to develop a human cell line for commer-
cial use. As a result, the investigators' rights and obligations must
be defined relative to those of the individual who supplied the tissue
or cells from which the cell line was developed. This task was
handed to the courts in Moore v. The Regents of the University of
California where a cell line with immense commercial value was
294. See generally R. BELLAH, R. MADSEN, W. SULLIVAN, A. SWIDLER, & S. TIPTON,
HABITS OF THE HEART INDIVIDUALISM AND COMMITMENT IN AMERICAN LIFE (1985).
295. See generally Veatch, Autonomy's Temporary Triumph, 14 HASTINGS CTR. R P. 38
(Oct. 1984); Callahan, Autonomy. A Moral Good, Not a Moral Obsession, 14 HASTINGS CTR.
REP. 40.
296. See eg., Sculley, supra note 250, at 398-99, 420-21 (arguing that shift from a mech-
anistic world view to a post-Newtonian paradigm will encourage creative use of personal
computers and new innovation in American business).
297. See eg., Danforth, supra note 130, at 200 (arguing that a fixed profit-sharing plan
or licensing agreement through which a patient would be compensated for the commercial
use of his or her tissue, would reflect the "continuous partnership between the researcher and
patient.").
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developed from the cells of Mr. John Moore without his knowledge
or consent. The legal issues raised by Moore can be analyzed in
familiar terms but prod the law to move in new directions.
In this article, the issues raised by Moore are analyzed as fol-
lows: The principle of informed consent protects the individual's
right to be informed if any proposed removal of tissue will serve a
commercial purpose. The common law right of privacy protects the
individual's right to consent to the commercial use of his or her
tissue once removed. Further, this aspect of the privacy right may
be recognized as a property right, of variable commercial worth,
which protects the individual's right to profit from the commercial
use of his or her tissue. The policy implications of this analysis
arguably point toward an organic view of life and technology.
There is a dynamic connection between all aspects of reality, so we
must recognize that individuals have dignity as whole persons, that
individuals exist in relationship with others oriented toward com-
mon human goals, that technology is an expression of our human
nature, and that our human nature is part of all nature.
The term, "biotechnology," is of recent origin but is derived
from ancient Greek: from bios meaning mode of life, from techne
meaning art or skill, and from logos meaning word.2 98 The combi-
nation in "biotechnology" is apt. The biotechnology age is an age
of synthesis. To move ahead we must respect the connections be-
tween our human abilities and life in all its dimensions. Further, we
must respect those connections in the laws and policies through
which we shape our world. Thus, the issues raised by Moore point
to another era, reflecting the challenge as well as the promise of
biotechnology.
298. See WETR'S NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 147 (bi- or bios-), 153
(biotechnology), 703 (-logy), 1211 (techno-, technology) (1988).
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